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Preface 
 
 The idea of writing the master’s thesis about the sustainability of the euro came from 
the media. The mass attention and criticism that the Eurozone has been experiencing recently 
made me curious to find out more. I wanted to write about something new that has relevance 
for the present and future times. 
 A course held by Arngrim Hunnes called history of economic crises was another 
reason that this subject became the topic of my thesis. Throughout this course I learned that 
there are general mechanisms that often seem to reoccur in economic crises throughout 
history. The role of monetary policy in the time of crisis was analyzed in the course, 
something that I have applied in the thesis. I was unsure how this was done in a currency 
union with one monetary policy for all its members and found that this was a tense subject. 
 I would like to thank my supervisor Arngrim Hunnes for supporting and 
acknowledging my idea of writing about this subject, and for helpful and quick feedback 
throughout the process. Especially the choice of theory and the forming of a structure for the 
thesis were important contributions. My fellow students creating a wonderful study 
environment deserves a notice as well. I have met many knowledgeable people during these 
five years and not least good friends.  
 The writing of this thesis has been the most challenging yet the most rewarding part of 
my five years here at the University of Agder. At times it was frustrating to do endless hours 
of research without any visible result. However, at the end it is a great feeling to have been 
able to dig deeper into a particular subject of interest and used what I have been taught during 
my education on a practical problem. 
 I hope whoever reads this will be able to follow the reasoning in the thesis. I have tried 
to express the arguments and theories surrounding this topic in the simplest possible way, 
while at the same time using objective economic thinking as the baseline. I hope the reader 
will gain knowledge of the presented problem and understand some of the troubles in the 
Eurozone at the moment and perhaps the future.   
Kristiansand, May 2011 
Trond Nygren 
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Summary 
     
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the economic sustainability of the Eurozone. 
The thesis has a macro-economic approach which looks at the Eurozone as a whole, with 
special emphasis on the peripheral countries of Europe that are experiencing a sovereign-debt 
crisis at the moment. Both economic theory and history will be used to illustrate the topic. 
The role of the currency union in the time of crisis is the main scope of the thesis. A 
monetary union in reality means fixing the exchange rates of the members against each other. 
Many countries outside the Eurozone that were also suffering from the economic shock of the 
financial crisis used their monetary policy as a mechanism to restore competitiveness. 
Lowering the interest rate or printing money ensured liquidity in the markets to limit the 
damage done by the economic shock. In the Eurozone the monetary policy for all its members 
is governed by the European Central Bank in Germany. Members of the currency union 
therefore have to accept a common monetary policy for all countries within it. This is a major 
disadvantage of having a currency union, and the loss of monetary independence is the basis 
for a debate that will be analyzed in the thesis. 
In the thesis both sides of this debate are presented. The criticism of the currency 
union has roots in the Optimum Currency Area theory (which is explained in the thesis), 
where Europe’s insufficient integration reveals flaws of the currency union. The economists 
arguing in favor of the currency union focus on the lack of realistic alternatives. 
The combination of high debt, low investor confidence and no control over domestic 
monetary policy is a problem for many European countries. Considering how the Eurozone 
institutionally is set up at the moment there is no clear solution. No system of fiscal transfers 
to ensure liquidity is present. This makes it legitimate to question the sustainability of the 
currency union as it works now. Institutional changes are likely to happen. 
This thesis presents proposals made by economists for such changes. The need for a 
crisis mechanism tool in order to prevent a future economic shock of having similar 
consequences as the shock of 2007/2008 has wide support. How it is going to work is a tense 
subject, as the richer countries of Europe are afraid of having to pay the periphery out of 
trouble.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
      
The creation of the euro was a proud moment in European history. It was possibly the 
greatest achievement made by the European Union so far when it arrived in 1999. This was 
the ultimate symbol of an economically integrated Europe that had left the previous rivalries 
behind. Cooperation and solidarity was the way forward.  
At the time of and before the creation of the euro not everyone was convinced 
however. In particular American economists arguing with support in the fundamentals of the 
Optimum Currency Area theory were skeptical. They believed that a continent like Europe, 
with no way near the same level of integration in the economy as the US, was bound to fail 
when creating a monetary union. Shocks in the economy were believed to pose a major threat 
to Europe if they introduced the euro. 
The baseline for the Optimum Currency Area theory is that the level of integration in 
the economy is the best measure for determining the success of a currency union. Criteria 
such as labor mobility, political integration and fiscal transfers will determine the ability of a 
currency area to reduce the consequences of asymmetric shocks. The more integration in the 
economy the better the grounds for a currency union exist. 
For a long time the euro was a success – it became a worldwide recognizable currency 
and price stability in the Eurozone prevailed. The single currency had seemingly lifted the 
periphery of Europe up to its potential; everyone in the market believed that when Europe had 
its own mutual currency the risk of failure was lower. For a long time Europe was looked 
upon with envy during the financial crisis in the late 2000s. The model of the welfare state 
had minimized the social consequences of the crisis. In the US the social consequences were 
higher. 
At this moment in 2011 the situation has turned completely. Now major countries of 
Europe are struggling with high debt levels and unsustainable budget deficits. Many of the 
same economists voicing their skepticism before the introduction of the euro are now 
hovering and reappearing with their old arguments. They projected this to happen and believe 
the major cause of the critical situation has to be blamed on the euro itself. The countries with 
difficulties have now lost their monetary independence and cannot react to the economic 
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shock with adjusting their interest rates. They are to some extent locked in and are dependent 
on help from the outside to restore competitiveness. 
Europe at the moment is being monitored closely by the world community. The 
Eurozone is a major economic player in the world market. It is of great importance to the rest 
of the world, and Europe especially, to restore competitiveness. A country like Greece is 
facing a mountain of debt and needs to undergo serious changes in its finances to turn the 
table. The authorities in Greece repeatedly say they are prepared to undergo the reforms that 
are needed, but the market does not seem to take notice. The government bonds of Greece at 
the moment have reached record breaking highs in comparison with Germany. 
The way out of the problems will not be easy. It will most likely include 
unemployment and wage decreases for the countries involved. The solution to the problem is 
also an issue that is heavily discussed. Europe is reluctant to creating a monetary union 
similar to that of the US where automatic fiscal transfers to the areas in trouble are done 
federally. Instead Europe, at least until now, has emphasized the need of a crisis mechanism 
tool which does not include such a fiscal transfer system.  
The title of this thesis is a question: “Is the Euro Sustainable?” The reason for such a 
dramatic question is the fact that the recent economic crisis has brutally shown the fragility of 
the currency union. When exposed to a massive economic shock such as the one in the late 
2000s, the need for a monetary policy beneficial for every member of the union becomes 
clear. When the countries of Europe have been struck asymmetrically and the level of 
integration is inferior compared to the US, the Eurozone is seemingly defenseless. Through 
heavy negotiations Europe did create a bailout package for the troubled economies, but it was 
something done in desperation when realizing the severity of the problems.   
This thesis will try to clarify the most important factors of the ongoing problems. 
Through history of European integration with emphasis on the creation of the currency union, 
economic theory, a presentation of the ongoing discussion with arguments from both sides, 
and a speculative part of the future, the sustainability of the Eurozone will be addressed. The 
situation at the present will be devoted time but also possible future measures in order to 
improve the sustainability will be analyzed, as well as bleaker outcomes that cannot be 
undermined given the critical situation at the moment.  
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At the time of writing a resolution is far from reached. Greece, a country that will be 
explained in more detail in the thesis, has an unbearable situation according to many reports. 
With confidence in the market reaching record lows it will be extremely difficult for Greece 
to change the conditions. A fear of contagion of risk is also worrisome, something that the 
market has seen some signs of.  
The present moment is probably the greatest challenge the Eurozone has experienced. 
If the Eurozone can get through this and change the institutions to prevent new crises, the 
outlook can be brighter. To do so will require much discipline and cooperation, something 
many doubt the Eurozone has enough of. 
The thesis is structured into six chapters. The first one is the introduction. The second 
chapter covers the history of economic integration in Europe and explains the happenings 
leading up to the currency union. It starts after the Second World War and ends up at the 
creation of the euro in 1999. It also explains the spirit of the time which was a positive 
outlook on the future of a possible currency union. 
The chapter concerning economic arguments for establishing a monetary union 
presents relevant economic theory. To be specific the Law of One Price, the Purchasing 
Power Parity, and most importantly the Optimum Currency Area theory are the ones that are 
covered.  
The euro at the present is the fourth chapter and includes an explanation of the current 
problems as of May 2011 in Europe. It does also voice opinions of influential economists in 
the debate of whether or not a currency union in Europe is advantageous. At the end opinions 
of a possible solution is presented. 
The fifth chapter is about the future of the Eurozone. It includes future challenges and 
speculations of outcomes of the current conditions. The sixth and last chapter is the 
conclusion of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: History of European Economic Integration and the Euro 
2.1 Introduction 
      
This part of the study will explain the happenings that made way for the monetary 
union. The most important aspects of the history of European Economic Integration from the 
Second World War until today will be covered, with special emphasis on the creation of the 
monetary union. Integration is important because a monetary union is considered a great step 
towards economic integration in Europe. The most interesting and applicable events to my 
study will be devoted the most focus. Because a unified currency is in the need of a closely 
integrated economy, history of economic integration within Europe will be important in the 
thesis. Understanding the current integration in Europe requires an understanding of the 
history. Certain challenges that the euro overcame will also be covered. 
History can often relate to the present by providing explanations to current events. 
Europe has been an area of the world throughout history often associated with war and 
rivalry, although as presented in this section we shall see that the idea of integration and 
cooperation within Europe is not completely new. It is also interesting to notice how the 
history affects countries’ feeling towards integration and losing independence. Countries that 
were positive towards integration in Europe from before continue to support the idea of 
cooperation in Europe. The idea of a step-by-step process of making the European continent 
more integrated has attracted many people and speeded up after the Second World War. 
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2.2 The Divide between Federalism and Intergovernmentalism – 
European Economic Community (EEA) and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA)   
 
There were two ideologies of European integration after World War 2. There was a 
common agreement within Europe that integration was the way forward, although the role of 
the nations was questioned. The two ideologies on this were federalism and 
intergovernmentalism. This is relevant even today because this divide and debate is still 
present. 
The federalist idea was based on fear of the sovereignty of the nation state. European 
states had always been involved in battles for power between them, and this structure was 
seen upon as prone to war because the race for power often involved invasion of other states. 
As recent history had proved even democracy could create dangerous and aggressive regimes. 
The only way to stop the inevitable rivalry that would come from independent states was 
through a supranational organization that would have the amount of power which traditionally 
was a privilege only for independent nations. This is called a federalist structure. A big step in 
the federalist movement came in 1952 by Robert Schuman who suggested that France and 
Germany should submit their coal and steel industries under supranational control. It might 
sound trivial today but it was big business at the time, and it provided the ground base for 
more sophisticated economic cooperation. Other nations were also invited to this partnership, 
four of whom actually joined. These were Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. 
To this date this group of countries in addition to France and Germany called “the six” have 
been the most supportive of European integration. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The other ideology was intergovernmentalism. The thinking here was that the nations 
and national governments were the most effective and stable structure. Cooperation between 
nations was however essential, especially in economic issues, but power should remain on 
national hands. Any cooperation needed to be agreed upon by all countries affected. (Baldwin 
& Wyplosz, 2009) 
Naturally the federalist movement was largely supported in countries with the most 
difficult governmental times i.e. the countries with the most destruction and deaths from the 
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war such as Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Germany. The intergovernmentalism 
movement had Britain in front and was supported by countries avoiding the worst 
consequences of the war such as Norway, Denmark, Iceland and neutral countries such as 
Sweden and Ireland. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
Leading political figures of the federalist six countries agreed to the treaties of Rome 
in 1957 that created the European Economic Community (EEC) in addition to the coal and 
steel agreement. The members of this group had merging the countries into a supranational 
structure with a much wider scope than the steel and coal agreement as their aim. The EEC 
was by far regarded as the most important point in the treaty in the later years and the Treaty 
of Rome became synonymous with the EEC treaty. The EEC was formed in 1958. Both the 
organizations created in the treaties of Rome merged into the “European Communities” (EC) 
in 1965. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The result of this treaty was a commitment of the six to a great degree of economic 
integration between them. They formed a customs union which removed barriers on trade 
between the nations, and created a common tariff system for imports from outside countries 
among many other policies. Many institutions between the nations were also created 
including the European Commission. The response to this discriminatory agreement from the 
outside was the creation of a similar organization called the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) with the UK in front. The result was a rapid increase of trade within each of the blocs 
and a loss for exporters within each group. The groups performed very unequally as well in 
economic measures. The six EEC nations’ GDP was more than double the seven EFTA 
countries, and for exporters the EEC was favorable. Because of this the EEC countries grew 
much faster since gaining entrance to the EEC market was more important than the same in 
the EFTA countries. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
In 1961 the UK wanted to enter the EEC. The threat of discrimination in Europe’s 
fastest growing markets became too great. This led to a domino-effect by other EFTA-
countries. They were suffering from unfavorable discrimination already and with the UK 
forced to also provide discriminatory barriers against EFTA members, discrimination would 
be even greater. Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied for membership in the EEC quickly 
after Britain. The remaining members of the EFTA did not join because of neutrality-issues or 
that trading with the EEC was not critical for them. After many delays because of French 
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skepticism to the UK and the other applicants the membership was approved in 1973 for the 
four countries. When this happened another domino-effect arose, this time in the form of a 
series of agreements concerning free trade between each of the remaining EFTA members and 
the EEC. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The economic performance of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s were exceptionally good 
and was accompanied by successful economic integration. This led to a more optimistic view 
on the national governments. A new wave of belief in the national countries swept over 
Europe. This was again led by France and their president Charles de Gaulle. The situation 
came to a climax when the Treaty of Rome was scheduled to go into its final part where 
majority voting in decisions was supposed to be introduced. De Gaulle felt this would 
undermine France’s authority because policies they were against could be forced upon them 
backed by the majority. The result was the so-called “Luxembourg compromise” where de 
Gaulle forced the other members of the EEC to accept unanimity as the way of deciding in the 
EEC through boycotting of the EEC-meetings (“empty chair policy”).  The Luxembourg 
compromise had no legal backing but still had a great significance. Unanimity became the 
practice when making most decisions. Naturally this led to an almost complete stagnation of 
European integration because most policies would be rejected by at least one member. 
(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The EEC’s lack of ability to make decisions led to an increase of trade barriers. Before 
the Luxembourg compromise there had been a steady decrease of trade barriers. The situation 
had now been reversed: the national trade barriers were implemented faster than the few 
decisions in favor of integration made by the EEC that were accepted. These barriers were 
designed to protect consumers. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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2.3 Exchange Rate Cooperation – the Bretton Woods System 
 
There was also exchange rate cooperation well before the introduction of the euro. 
After the Second World War a system called the Bretton Woods system for exchange rates 
between currencies arose. Preparations for this system had begun earlier however, but it was 
the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was the most important step of the 
Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. It was supposed to provide the stability of which the 
gold standard system in the interwar period failed to give. Significant features of the IMF’s 
Bretton Woods system was that exchange rates were fixed; the dollar was the fixed parity that 
all currencies had to value themselves against, and the dollar value was fixed towards gold. 
All currencies had a par value in terms of the dollar which they could not move more than 1% 
away from. The IMF was allowed to provide loans to countries that struggled to handle their 
debt instead of a possible devaluation of the currency. (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The Bretton Woods system proved quite efficient for a long time. Stability of the 
exchange rates was the melody and trade increased. The IMF governed the system through 
usage of loans which came from member deposits. These were based on the respective 
country’s international trade. The level of international trade and member deposits were also 
linked with the country’s influence within the system as well as the amount allowed to borrow 
from the IMF. Devaluations were supposed to be the last option for economies with 
fundamental problems that could not be regarded as temporarily. The IMF still exists today in 
the form of a “bank” for countries involved in economic difficulties.  (Burda & Wyplosz, 
2009)  
While the Bretton Woods system had a promising start, it was a system with a notable 
flaw. As countries recovered from the war and international trade increased, the demand for 
international money subsequently increased as well. In the Bretton Woods system the 
international money was the American dollar meaning that in practice more American dollars 
were needed. The only way that the US was able to do this was through trade deficits, 
resulting in a gradual move towards a point where eventually the USA’s liabilities abroad 
would exceed their gold reserves. USA could no longer provide the gold value of the US 
dollar. This is called the triffin paradox, named after the Belgian economist Robert Triffin 
who first discovered the phenomena. (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009)  
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The Triffin paradox weakened the international credibility towards the Bretton Woods 
system. Criticism from other countries became more frequent, with France being the most 
prominent. In addition to this the Vietnam War and other unfavorable circumstances 
increased the trade deficits of the US. The market was aware of the situation and the demand 
for gold rose. No one wanted to sell gold, and the situation became unclear. The unfavorable 
economic situation led to a recession in both the US and Europe. The result was the decision 
to remove the gold parity of the dollar made by President Nixon in 1971, and the demise of 
the Bretton Woods system.  (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009) 
When the Bretton Woods system collapsed, a vacuum presented itself in Europe. The 
system had provided stability at least in the short run, and had pushed European economic 
integration forward. The creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was the 
reaction to the Bretton Woods collapse. The EMS was a new system of fixed exchange rates 
among European countries of the European Community, or the European Union as it was later 
called. A new version of the EMS was introduced in 1999, as a preface to join the current 
European Monetary Union. According to Burda and Wyplosz, the EMS was involved in four 
phases. The first phase was characterized by a loose structure that had a high degree of 
tolerance towards inflation among its members. The second phase was a successful period 
where the Deutsche Mark was identified as the benchmark for the other currencies. This 
period eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. The third phase was the currency crisis 
of the early 1990s that I will mention later, and the fourth phase was the phase of stability 
following the crisis. (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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2.4 Change in European Policy and the Single Market Programme 
   
After the economic crisis right before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
economy recovered in the mid-1980s. Political attitudes in this period changed as well, with a 
more increased belief in the market economy. US President Reagan and British Prime 
Minister Thatcher were important in this change. Another important factor was the failure of 
earlier protectionist policies. Coincidentally this healthy economic environment was 
accompanied with the arrival of Jacques Delors, a firm believer of European integration and a 
talented speaker. He was appointed as President of the European Commission in 1985. He 
made way for the “Single Market Programme” which listed 300 efforts to change the 
Common Market into the Single Market. All members had adopted the Single European Act 
by 1987 which was the formal name of the law for this procedure. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2009) 
Before this was implemented there were many trade barriers present in Europe, which 
limited the free movement of goods, labor and services, even though the Treaty of Rome 
involved these issues. The Single Market Programme’s main goal was to implement the “four 
freedoms” that were promised in the Treaty of Rome, but not present in practice. These were 
removal of barriers restricting movement of goods, services, people and capital. Another 
important institutional feature of the Single European Act was the abolishment of the 
unanimity policy in favor of majority voting to overcome similar decision-making difficulties 
as in the 1970s. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
Once again this increasing of integration within the EU posed a threat of 
discrimination to countries left outside this cooperation. It led to another phase where 
countries considered membership. Jacques Delors reacted to the situation and created the 
European Economic Area which in practice was a broadening of the Single Market 
Programme to include EFTA economies. Given the threat of discriminatory policies it is easy 
to understand the EFTA countries desire for the EEA. The EEA does however have 
democratic issues in the sense that EFTA countries can be forced legislation upon them 
without having any real influence, as well as imposing supranational features to EFTA 
countries which is something they historically have been against. This caused many EFTA 
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countries to apply for membership to the EU. Today the EEA consists of the EU25 plus 
Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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2.5 The planning of the monetary union: The Maastricht treaty and the 
Convergence Criteria 
 
The Maastricht Treaty is probably best known for providing the base for progress 
towards a monetary union in Europe, although the treaty goes way beyond only monetary 
terms. Jacque Delors took advantage of the unstable situation after the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the Berlin Wall. Inspired by the successful Single Market, he wanted to suggest a 
monumental increase in European integration. Other European leaders agreed with Delors and 
supported his vision. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The strategy for implementation of the monetary union was supposed to be gradual, 
and a possible entry into the union should be based on certain criteria. The treaty was signed 
in Maastricht Netherlands, in December 1991 (Grauwe, 2009). Political ambitions came on 
the agenda and made the Maastricht Treaty go beyond its original motive which was creation 
of a common market. (EuropeanCommission, 2007) 
The monetary union came about twelve years after the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The period from 1991 until the monetary union was characterized by a gradual 
process towards the monetary union. (Grauwe, 2009) A country could only join the union if 
certain economic criteria were met. These are called the convergence criteria. 
(EuropeanCommission, 2011) 
Germany was the driving force behind these criteria because they were concerned 
about price stability and questioned other countries commitment in this area. In the early 
1990s when the Maastricht treaty was signed the macroeconomic environment varied greatly 
from country to country in Europe (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009). The following are the five 
convergence criteria: 
1) The inflation rate of the country shall not exceed above 1,5%  of the average of the 
three lowest inflation rates within EU. 
2) The long-term interest rate of the country shall not exceed above 2% of the average in 
these three countries. 
3) The country must have joined the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, as well as 
avoided devaluations of the currency at least two years before entering the union. 
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4) The government budget deficit is not above 3% of the GDP (If it is it should be 
declining). 
5) The government debt should not be above 60% of GDP (If it is it should be declining). 
(Grauwe, 2009)  
Price stability and control over inflation is important issues for countries engaging in a 
monetary union. To keep a stable currency all countries need to work toward this goal. The 
five convergence criteria therefore have this as their main focus. (Grauwe, 2009) 
The first three of these convergence criteria are mainly concerned about inflation. The 
first one specifies it directly. The second criterion aims at “catching cheaters” or making it 
impossible to lower inflation on a temporary basis to gain admittance to the union and then go 
back to old habits. This is done through not allowing a long-term high interest rate which 
usually reflects a market’s acceptance of high inflation. The third criterion also involves price 
stability and the exchange rate mechanism. A country has to have proven itself capable of 
keeping their currency relatively fixed to the possible monetary union partners of the future. 
(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
While the three first criteria involve price stability and inflation, the last two cover the 
incentives behind these issues. High inflation itself is not considered a wanted economic 
situation but still some countries experience facing this issue. A high degree of inflation is 
usually linked with budget deficits and high public debt. The process is rather simple: When a 
country runs budget deficits it borrows money to finance this. If this is done excessively there 
will at some point be legitimate questions between the lending countries on whether or not 
this debt will ever be paid back. The reaction can be to stop lending the country with budget 
deficits money. If this happens a problem arises: The only way that the country can continue 
to run budget deficits is through the central bank printing money, which of course leads to 
high inflation. Consequently the fourth and fifth convergence criteria deal with budget deficits 
and public debt respectively. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
In 1998 it was determined that 11 of the EU members successfully met the criteria. 
The countries were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. These countries formed the monetary union in 1999. At 
the start the euro was not a “normal” currency with bills. It was exclusively used by banks and 
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for accounting. The creation of the banknotes and coins and the removal of the national 
currencies that completed the monetary union in Europe came in 2002.  Three countries, 
Sweden, Denmark and the UK, decided not to enter the monetary union regardless of meeting 
the criteria. (Grauwe, 2009).  Still these countries have not adopted the monetary union. 
Sweden was a unique case. They violated condition three of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria on purpose in order to prevent entrance to the EMU. Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovakia made the union include 16 members (Grauwe, 2009). As of today the currency is 
shared by 17 European countries and approximately 331 million people. Estonia was the last 
country to join the monetary union in 2011. (EuropeanCommission, 2011) 
 
Figure 1: History of European Integration and the EU 
Source: (Figure 12.1, Gärtner, 2006, p. 319) 
Figure 1 is an overview of the most significant events in the history of economic 
integration in Europe relevant to the EU. It starts with the Treaty of Rome in 1958 and ends 
up with the new members entering the union in 2004. The bottom part of the model illustrates 
the monetary integration in Europe, while the upper part of the model focuses on EU 
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membership growth and when the different members entered the union. Some parts of this 
model have been covered in the history part of my thesis, but it would have been too 
comprehensive to involve everything for the case of my study. What this model can help 
illustrate however is that the history of economic integration in Europe is complex and 
involves an array of different events, before ultimately ending up in the position that Europe 
is in today. The European Union has expanded greatly along the way and the euro has come 
about through a step-by-step process of monetary integration. 
After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the euro was subject to many challenges 
before it actually went into practice. Yet, the euro survived these challenges and became the 
common currency of the euro area that we know today. I will now look at some important 
points of the opposition at the time, and explain the arguments behind a common currency 
that might have relevance to its founding and existence today. 
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2.6 Challenges of the euro from Maastricht until implementation: How 
did the euro survive? 
      
The period from 1991 when the Maastricht treaty was signed until 2002 when the 
implementation of the currency was done, the euro had its fair share of challenges to cope 
with.  
One of these was an almost rejection of the currency by the French people in 1992 
(Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Knope, & Roscher, 1999). One can only speculate what the 
consequences would be for the euro if the outcome of the referendum was different. It is 
however easy to imagine that a rejection from such an influential country as France could 
potentially jeopardize the whole plan of a monetary union. 
The European Monetary system went through a crisis shortly (1992/1993) after the 
Maastricht treaty, which threatened to ruin the plans of a single currency in Europe (Risse, et 
al., 1999). The reuniting of Germany was financed through public loans. The central bank of 
Germany implemented a more restrictive monetary policy in order to reset the possible effect 
the loans had on currency stability (Malz, 1996). This led to a turbulent market that was prone 
to speculative attacks on the ERM parities (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009). The speculations led to 
many interventions from the exchange rate mechanism and the domestic central banks, when 
the years before 1992 were a period of little intervention (Malz, 1996). In addition to this the 
Danish public rejected the Maastricht treaty, which in consequence heightened the general 
skepticism towards a monetary union (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009). Italy and the UK were 
other countries that withdrew from the ERM, and their currencies were left to float on their 
own (Malz, 1996). A central component in this crisis was the intense battle between France 
and Germany to become the anchor currency of the ERM. The French and the German central 
bank attacked the currencies of each other (Rhodes & Mazey, 1995). The unclear environment 
and heavy speculation nearly made the ERM come to an end. The stabilization of the situation 
came when the margins of fluctuation of the parities rose to 15%, which in practice meant that 
the fixed exchange system was similar to a free-floating regime. The stabilization made way 
for the transition towards a Monetary Union. (Burda & Wyplosz, 2009) 
There was also a high level of initial opposition towards the monetary union, 
underlined by the negative result from the first Danish referendum, and the neck and neck 
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result from the important French referendum. The convergence criteria included in the 
Maastricht treaty proved difficult for many countries to deal with as well, given the tough 
economic environment. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
In the final part towards transition some obvious technical problems arose. These were 
related to the conversion rates. How should the transition be done smoothly without any 
speculative attacks? 
The treaty together with a decision made at the Madrid council in 1995 stated that one 
euro currency unit (ECU) would transform into one euro on January 1
st
 1999 (Grauwe, 2009). 
―The ECU was defined as a basket of currencies of the countries that are members of the 
EMS‖ (Grauwe, 2009, p. 118). Consequently the conversion rates of the national currencies 
against the upcoming euro had to be equal to the rates in the market at closing day December 
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 1998. This was done in order to prevent that the beginning of the EMU would be troubled 
by changes in the exchange rates and create possibilities for gains and losses through 
speculations.  These conditions undoubtedly resulted in a potential for speculation before the 
last day of the year. Because it was announced that the market rates at the last day of 1998 
would be used as the conversion rates as fixed forever, movements during this day would be 
crucial for the upcoming launch of the EMU. If someone were to speculate the exchange rate 
of one national currency against another upwards during the last day, this speculative attack 
would result in an irreversibly “false” exchange rate. Academics in cooperation with the 
authorities solved this issue by announcing the conversion rates well in advance. If these rates 
were regarded as credible it was thought that the market itself would adapt to these rates. It 
worked out smoothly. The authorities announced the rates in May 1998 and the market was 
also informed that the national central banks would work together in order to achieve this in 
terms of the appropriate policy responses. Little intervention in the market had to be done; 
there were a great deal of confidence that the conversion rates were set correctly. (Grauwe, 
2009) 
“To Euro or Not to Euro” (Risse, et al., 1999) tries to explain why the euro has 
overcome these great obstacles. The article focuses on economic reasons linked with 
European integration. The single currency is viewed as a logical “next-step” after the 
European single market, and it facilitates free exchanges of goods, services, labor and capital. 
The EMU was viewed as the only and final solution to stop speculations on the currencies and 
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protectionist trade behavior. Only a strong central organization could stop the situation that 
evolved in the early 1990s. The euro should ensure the elimination of transaction costs and 
might possibly enhance investments. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
 The article also has a focus on the motives behind the decision of monetary union at 
the time. It has been claimed by some that the decision were influenced by political pressure 
and political motives rather than pure economic motives and theory. 
The preceding are good economic arguments but many economists were not 
impressed. Classical economists disagree with each other on the issue of how advantageous a 
currency union really is without a common policy. Some believe that the European central 
bank always will be subject to political pressure and never become 100% independent. There 
are also disagreements among economic theorists on what an optimum currency area really is. 
One thing that is clear though, is that the acceptance of the 11 initial countries in the Eurozone 
was mainly a political decision, and had not much to do with the Optimum Currency Area 
theory. Over 300 leading economists argued against the EMU in 1997, followed by 150 
German economists doing the same in 1998. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
Furthermore the article finds a peculiar correlation between the policy-makers interests 
in European integration and their economic reasoning for establishing the EMU. This 
correlation does not say much about the connection between this but it does say that 
economics are not the main motivation behind the decisions. If it was otherwise one would 
expect that countries practicing a more classical oriented economy to be in favor of a single 
currency, while other countries will be concerned about their welfare state and its survival. 
Britain as a skeptic does not fit in with this description as opposed to for instance France and 
Germany which are more socialist countries. Additionally if economic motives were 
dominant in the decision-making process one would expect clear differences in opinions of 
different parties within lone countries. This is the case of course but not in the way one would 
expect where left-wing parties would be against the EMU and the right-wing parties the 
opposite. In both France and Britain the conservatives represented the strongest resistance 
against the euro from the start. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
An important geopolitical reason for the EMU can be the end of the Cold War and the 
unification of Germany. Many countries, especially France, believed that sharing the power 
over an independent European central bank was better than giving the German “Bundesbank” 
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too much influence. This was a result of the historical events in the 20
th
 century that created 
mistrust to a strong independent Germany. This fear was real, although somewhat irrational, 
because Germany was a strong supporter of the single currency. In addition for this argument 
to be valid there needs to be an assumption that a single currency and centralized European 
institutions would constrain the power of Germany, which is not necessarily true. (Risse, et 
al., 1999) 
Another reason why the euro managed to stand up against opposition is the path that 
the Maastricht treaty began. The cost of switching route in another direction became 
progressively larger with time, both in the form of more negotiation and the creation of costly 
public institutions. The institutions especially in the southern part of Europe needed a major 
face-lift in order to meet the convergence criteria. Fear of the global community’s response 
towards a change was increasing. The crisis of 1992-1993 might have had the effect of 
strengthening the belief in the euro, in the way that the unstable capital and currency markets 
needed to be stabilized. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
The article also claims that nation state identities were important in the decision 
making process of the EMU. The different cultures of the nations were reflected through the 
discussion. The reason why Britain was skeptical for instance, is said to be because of their 
conservative nature and their history as the only superpower in the world. Among the 
conservatives in England especially, giving up the pound was seen as a hard blow. It was one 
of the proudest symbols of their great past. This research investigated the elites in the country 
and had little focus on the public mass. The focus was on the political decision-makers and 
how their opinions were linked with nation state identities. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
There definitely are clear cut economic advantages in a single currency that cannot be 
disputable, such as lowering transaction costs and eliminating heavy fluctuations of 
currencies. Still, the variation of opinions in the political landscape between European 
countries poses a problem that can be difficult to solve. The OCA theory is also a theory 
where optimality is virtually impossible in reality, and the different criteria for integration are 
difficult to measure exactly. It is therefore hard to be categorical on whether or not the 
decision of establishing the EMU was right or wrong in economic terms at the time, although 
from the “To Euro or not to Euro” article it seems clear that political arguments played an 
important part in the decision. (Risse, et al., 1999) 
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Chapter 3: Economic Arguments for Establishing a Monetary Union: 
Economic Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
      
If we use economic theory in order to evaluate the decision of establishing the 
monetary union in 1999, we can come up with an array of arguments. This part will cover the 
economic arguments in light of economic theory.  There are clear economic advantages of 
having a common currency between countries, but at the same time certain factors need to be 
in place in order for a monetary union to be effective. A monetary union will do more harm 
than good if these conditions are not present, because a common policy and relatively 
homogenous countries in certain respects are important stabilizers for a currency area. It is 
therefore useful for the sake of evaluating the monetary union in Europe to identify what a 
successful, stable currency consists of and which factors support a successful monetary union. 
The theories presented in this thesis are the law of one price and its connection with the 
purchasing power parity theory, as well as the Optimum Currency Area theory. The former 
being the relationship between the general price level in the economy and how the exchange 
adjust to this, and with price stability being the most important economic goal for the 
monetary union the understanding of this mechanism is essential, the latter listing criteria for 
an optimum currency area with a neutral perspective without regarding traditional country 
borders. Europe is not a country but it can be an optimum currency area according to the 
theory which measures integration using certain parameters. 
Critics have stated that economic reasoning was not the main driving force behind the 
establishment of the currency union, but rather a romantic idea of convenience and increased 
economic growth through establishing the monetary union with little evidence to support such 
claims. This will be discussed in the thesis but for now I will present the economic theory 
chosen as relevant for discussing the issue on a strict economic basis. 
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3.2 The Law of One Price and the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
       
As presented in the historical part of this study we will see that the conditions for 
countries to enter the Eurozone monetary union mainly involve the ability to preserve price 
stability in order to maintain a stable currency. This is done through the convergence criteria 
stated in the Maastricht treaty that countries need to fulfill before entering the Eurozone. It is 
therefore useful to address how the price level of a country is linked with the exchange rate. 
―The law of one price states that in competitive markets free of transportation costs 
and official barriers to trade (such as tariffs), identical goods sold in different countries must 
sell for the same price when their prices are expressed in terms of the same currency.‖ 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009, p. 383) 
The law of one price states that the price for the same commodity must be the same in 
two countries when using the same currency if there hypothetically were no barriers to trade 
or transportation costs present. The idea is that in a completely free market a consumer in one 
country will have the economic incentives to import the same good from abroad if it is more 
expensive domestically, resulting in pressure for a relative decrease in prices domestically and 
a relative increase in foreign prices until the prices are identical in both markets. This is of 
course in terms of the same currency. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
―The theory of purchasing power parity states that the exchange rate between two 
countries’ currencies equals the ratio of the countries’ price levels.‖ (Krugman & Obstfeld, 
2009, p. 384) 
This statement says that changes in the domestic price level will result in appropriate 
changes in the exchange rate. For example an increase in the domestic price level will be 
followed by currency depreciation in the foreign exchange market. The reasoning behind the 
theory was done as early as in the nineteenth century by David Ricardo among others. 
Controversy has surrounded the theory but it does without a doubt involve factors that help 
explain why exchange rates fluctuate. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
The difference between these two theories is that the law of one price explains changes 
in the price of a single commodity, while the purchasing power parity applies to the general 
price level in the economy involving prices of all commodities. Thus, if the law of one price 
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applies to all products and services in the economy the purchasing power parity will hold as 
well. Supporters of the PPP theory states that it can hold even though the law of one price 
does not necessarily hold for all commodities. They state that although the law of one price 
fails for some commodities the exchange rate between countries will not deviate dramatically 
from the price level ratio between them. When facing a change in the general price level in 
the economy it will be accompanied by an appropriate push in demand for the products and 
currencies, resulting in movement towards the PPP relation. The conclusion is that when the 
law of one price does not hold the economic relations will help the currency restore its 
purchasing power. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
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3.3 Optimum Currency Areas 
 
In reality, the joining of the Eurozone currency region is the same as entering an area 
of fixed exchange rates. There are benefits and drawbacks of having a fixed exchange rate. 
The theory of Optimum Currency Areas by Robert A. Mundell addresses these issues. It 
mainly focuses on the degree of integration within the currency region. The higher degree of 
integration in the currency area the more effective it will be. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
3.3.1 Benefits of a fixed exchange rate area: The GG schedule  
A great economic advantage of entering a fixed exchange rate system is the increased 
efficiency of transactions. When a country has its own currency that floats freely against 
another, economic trade between them becomes more complex. It increases the risk and 
uncertainty of the trading. Trading will also involve more work and become more time-
consuming in the sense that more “unneeded” calculations need to be done. If a country enters 
the euro currency area for example, trading with countries within this area will involve less 
transaction costs and become more efficient. The currency risk will also be eliminated. The 
exact number of this gain is of course hard, if not impossible to measure. (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2009). The European Commission’s estimations calculated it to be between 
13billion and 20 billion euros each year however, which is about 0,25-0,5% of the total GDP 
(Grauwe, 2009). What is evident however, is that the more a country trades with the countries 
involved in the euro currency, the more the gain is for entering the fixed exchange regime 
present in Europe. A country that trades heavily with Europe has more to gain in fixing the 
exchange rate to the euro, than a country that does not. If factors of production can move 
freely between a given country and the euro area, the gains from fixing the exchange rate will 
also be higher. Both the investors investing in Europe, as well as people working in the euro 
area will gain more predictability. The increased price transparency may influence the price 
level. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
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Figure 2: The GG Schedule 
Source:  (Figure 20-3, Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009, p. 576) 
The figure presented above shows the relation between the degree of economic 
integration between the euro area and a given country wanting to enter the euro area 
(horizontal axis), and the benefits for the lone country of joining the monetary union (vertical 
axis). This curve is called the GG schedule. As shown this relation results in an upward 
sloping curve because increasing economic integration gives increasing monetary efficiency. 
Implicitly in this model there is an assumption that the euro area has a stable price level. If 
this is not the case, then the efficiency gain of joining the monetary union would be smaller. 
The unstable prices would then create uncertainty for the country. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 
2009) 
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3.3.2 Costs of a fixed exchange rate area: The LL schedule  
There are also costs of joining a fixed exchange rate area, no matter how stable the 
area is. An important one is the loss of monetary independence. Monetary policy and the 
exchange rate can be used as a tool for stabilizing the economy. Output and employment can 
be influenced through this. When entering a monetary union a country is no longer 
independent and cannot decide these issues alone. The result is a loss of economic stability. 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
The stability loss that occurs when a country joins a fixed currency regime and the 
degree of integration with Europe in our case, are the key components of the LL schedule. 
The relation between these two needs to be understood before we can derive the schedule. 
The aggregate demand of a country is defined as: ―the amount of a country’s goods and 
services demanded by households and firms throughout the world.‖ (Krugman & Obstfeld, 
2009, p. 421)  
Changes in the aggregate demand of countries happen frequently. It is important to 
address that a country will experience serious problems when having a fixed exchange rate 
and the aggregate demand of the country alone goes down. If the aggregate demand of 
European area in general goes down, the euro will depreciate in order to stabilize the 
situation. Thus, the problem is not as serious as if there is an exclusive drop in aggregate 
demand for the lone country. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
In a monetary union the effects of a loss in aggregate demand for a country within the 
union are greater. Or rather, one of the methods in order to restore the situation disappears.          
When aggregate demand shifts from one country to another within a currency union, 
both countries will experience challenges. The country facing a negative shift will experience 
higher unemployment and reduced output. The country facing the positive shift will 
experience an upturn that will pressure the relative price level in the economy. Mechanisms to 
restore the situation back to par are wage flexibility, mobility of labor and monetary policy. 
(Grauwe, 2009) 
If the wages are sufficiently flexible the country facing a loss in the aggregate demand 
will be faced with a loss in the wage rate. The aggregate supply curve will then make a shift 
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downwards and provide a new equilibrium point. Similarly the country facing the positive 
shock in aggregate demand will face an increase in the wage rate and a positive shift of the 
aggregate supply curve. A new equilibrium point will appear. The situation will be stabilized 
because the country facing the negative aggregate demand will have decreased production 
costs in producing goods cause of lower wages, making their products more competitive and 
increasing demand. The other country’s products will face a loss in competitiveness because 
of cheaper products from abroad. (Grauwe, 2009) 
Another mechanism that will restore the effects of an asymmetric shock back to 
normal is full mobility of labor. Here the restoration will happen through movement of labor 
from the country facing a drop in aggregate demand to the country facing the positive rise. 
This situation eliminates the need to change the wage level in the two countries. 
Unemployment problems for the country facing a negative shock will disappear, which will 
result in the removal of wage inflation in the country facing the opposite shock. (Grauwe, 
2009) 
The last way of restoring the situation and preventing inflationary pressures is through 
the monetary policy. This method cannot be done in a monetary union because the countries 
involved in it are not completely independent and thus able to freely use monetary policy. If 
the two countries facing asymmetric shocks had flexible exchange rates, they could simply 
have stimulated or reduced aggregate demand through reducing or increasing the domestic 
interest rate. The likely effect of this would have been a depreciation of the currency of the 
troubled economy and conversely an appreciation of the booming economy’s currency. This 
would of course have implicated a change in the prices of their respective goods and thereby 
also changing the aggregate demand back to normal. (Grauwe, 2009) 
In other words if wages are rigid and labor mobility is not sufficient, it will be hard for 
a country within a monetary union to react to asymmetric shocks. However through insurance 
systems it is possible to reduce the problems. This is done through transferring funds from the 
booming economy to the one having problems. It is important to notice that the insurance 
mechanism does not neglect the underlying problem whether it being rigid wages or low labor 
mobility. The insurance mechanism can, especially during permanent asymmetric shocks, 
create a moral hazard problem reducing the incentives to adjust wages. (Grauwe 2009) 
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The insurance mechanism can be done either through a public or a private system. The 
example made by de Grauwe of a public system is a system where a part of the two countries’ 
government budgets is centralized, and a European government ensuring social benefits 
exists. In this case the country with a loss in output will accumulate less tax income to the 
European government, and the opposite for the other country. Social benefits costs will 
increase in the struggling country through larger degree of unemployment and conversely be 
reduced in the booming country. This will result in a stabilization of output over time back to 
normal. Another public insurance mechanism when not having centralized governments is 
simply through more careful behavior when a decrease in tax revenues through a lower output 
will increase the budget deficit and debt of the government. (Grauwe 2009) 
A private insurance mechanism when being in a monetary union is done through the 
stock market.  Here the asymmetric shock will be readjusted if the countries’ two markets are 
fully integrated. The transfer of funds here is done through residents of the booming country 
paying part of the output loss in the struggling economy through loss of value in their foreign 
stocks. Conversely residents of the struggling economy having stocks in the other country will 
earn some of the output gain by having stocks in the booming economy. (Grauwe 2009) 
The level of integration is the basis for how dramatic the effects of the shock are. The 
correlation is that a greater level of integration means a lower drop in prices and wages. The 
thinking behind is that in an economy closely integrated with Europe, a small drop in prices in 
a certain country would increase the demand for that country’s goods in Europe. Another 
issue is that workers in that country can easily move to EU countries in order to find jobs in 
tougher times. In both cases, the result is a more swift movement towards full employment in 
cases of higher integration with the Eurozone. Conversely an increase in aggregate demand 
will be shifted back to equilibrium with a small increase in the price level. (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2009) 
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Figure 3: The LL Schedule 
Source: (Figure 20-4, Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009, p. 579) 
So the conclusion is that if a country introduces the euro currency, a high integration 
with Europe will result in a smaller stability loss if the economy is disturbed. These 
disturbances can be for instance changes in aggregate demand for a country’s products. From 
this statement we can derive the LL schedule, which consists of the economic stability loss for 
a country joining a fixed exchange region on the vertical axis, and the degree of economic 
integration with that region on the horizontal axis. The downward sloping curve reflects the 
previous argument; higher integration means less of a stability loss. This is shown in figure 3. 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
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3.3.3 When to Fix the Exchange Rate: The intersection between the GG and the 
LL Schedules 
When these two curves have been explained, one can put them together in the same 
diagram. Here we get both the positive gains from joining the fixed currency area, and the 
negative losses, as well as the crucial degree of economic integration with the area. The 
intersection of the GG and the LL curves provides an interesting point θ1. At this level of 
integration with the fixed currency area, the gains equal the losses of joining the fixed 
currency. At a higher level of integration there will be a net gain by introducing the fixed 
exchange rate, and at a lower level of integration there will be a net loss by the same action. 
As long as the red GG line is above the blue LL line, it will be beneficial for the analyzed 
country to enter the fixed exchange rate area. These curves are in reality dynamic however. 
Shifts will occur for instance in changes in aggregate demand for a country’s products. 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 4: Intersection of the GG and the LL Schedules 
Source: (Figure 20-6, Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009, p. 582) 
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So what the GG-LL model (figure 4) essentially conveys is that the more integrated an 
economic area is, the more beneficial it is to have a fixed exchange rate within this area. An 
economic area is not necessarily a country, usually an optimum currency area involve more 
than one country. Economic integration involves factors such as trade of goods and services 
and easy mobility of factors of production. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
A larger currency area is beneficial in the sense that the transaction costs are lowered. 
However, adding countries to a currency area does only give net gain when the marginal 
benefits exceed the marginal costs. Where the marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal 
for adding a new country represents the optimal size of a currency area. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2009) 
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3.3.4 The criteria for the optimum currency area  
While the previous analysis was of a general character and mainly conveyed that the 
efficiency of a currency union depends on the net benefits for creating one, which is based on 
the degree of integration in the currency area, this section will more thoroughly address what 
creates efficient economic integration applicable in the optimum currency area. 
The first criterion for the model is proposed by Robert Mundell, and is called labor 
mobility (Mundell, 1961). The thought process behind this criterion is that if factors of 
production (labor and capital) were completely mobile, the cost of sharing the same currency 
would be eliminated. With the assumption that capital is mobile the challenge is present in 
gaining labor mobility. It is explained as follows: When one country is facing unemployment 
while another is facing inflationary pressure, the problems can be solved through the 
movement of factors of production. The solution is to move capital and labor from the country 
with inflationary issues towards the country struggling with unemployment. An interesting 
note is that this movement does not affect prices or wages in these two countries. (Baldwin & 
Wyplosz, 2009) 
The labor mobility criterion makes perfect economic sense. The reality is however 
more complex. As mentioned, capital is regarded as much more mobile than labor. Labor 
involves people moving, which is a relatively more complex process than simply moving 
capital. Moving labor across borders is of course more of a hurdle than moving within 
countries. Barriers such as language, culture and differences in institutions are often 
significant when moving to another country. Another issue is that countries specialize in 
producing certain goods because of different competitive advantages, making it more difficult 
for labor to move. It is not certain that an equivalent job that a worker enjoys domestically 
even exists in a foreign country. Finally, it is useful to address whether or not capital actually 
is mobile. While financial capital is rather mobile, the same cannot be said for equipment 
used in the production process. After all, a worker is seemingly useless without the proper 
equipment needed to do the job, which may not even be present in a different country. 
(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The second criterion is presented by Peter Kenen and involves product diversification. 
If countries have a more diverse range of product that they produce, the frequency of 
asymmetric shocks will be greatly reduced (Kenen, 1969). The risk for asymmetric shocks is 
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far greater for a country specializing in one product, because changes in demand for that 
product will have dramatic effects for this country, while a country producing a wide variety 
of goods will not be greatly affected by demand shifts for a certain product. If members of a 
currency union are well diversified in their production, shocks will more likely be symmetric 
or have small consequences, and the need for interventions in the exchange rate will be 
smaller. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
Ronald McKinnon has presented the openness criterion (McKinnon, 1962). The logic 
behind this statement is that countries trading heavily with each other will have less use of 
having different exchange rates. Prices will adjust automatically in an open market where it is 
easy to buy products from different areas. Competition will push the prices down regardless 
of what currency the countries might have. Relative to the currency used the prices will be the 
same in one country compared with another under perfect competition (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2009). This criterion is of course linked with the law of one price and the purchasing power 
parity theories presented earlier in this part of the thesis. 
Fiscal transfers can be an important tool in order to compensate for shocks. A large 
degree of cooperation between countries in fiscal policy will be beneficial for an optimum 
currency area. A country struggling with a negative shock in the economy will benefit from a 
fiscal transfer from another country engaging in a booming economy. Conversely the country 
which pays for the transfer will be expected to receive the same type of help if they should 
have similar problems. With a closely integrated fiscal policy one can create somewhat of an 
insurance system where countries in recessions will receive a transfer from a country with a 
booming economy, minimizing the effects of an asymmetric shock. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 
2009) 
Another issue to take into consideration is the assumption of homogeneous 
preferences. Countries dealing differently with even a symmetric shock can be problematic. 
When having a single common currency, it is a great advantage to have a common agreement 
between countries on how to deal with shocks in the economy. There are no clear-cut answers 
on this – there are costs and benefits for each decision. Having a strong currency has its 
benefits and its costs, as does having a weak one. If there are serious conflicting opinions on 
these issues, the central bank will become controversial and whatever decision it makes can 
potentially harm the monetary union. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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Finally there is a need for solidarity from countries within an optimum currency area. 
An important cause of conflict here is that the need for solidarity can conflict national 
interests. Within countries with independent currencies there are usually disagreements and 
discussions when officials decide on monetary issues. For the most part these decisions can be 
made because the inhabitants of the country are willing to sacrifice own needs in favor of the 
majority – or the most benefit for everyone. This is more problematic in a monetary union. A 
key issue is to make every member of the union understand that certain decisions needs to be 
done for the cause of everyone and to implement a feeling of togetherness and solidarity that 
surpasses the nationalism of the single country. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
This is the basis for an optimum currency area to work perfectly. An optimum 
currency area is an area with a great degree of integration and cooperation between countries. 
The points presented in this section are however not in reality completely fulfilled, even 
within countries with an independent currency. There will always be some disagreements and 
perfect integration will most likely never happen. What these issues can shed light upon 
however is that the more integration and solidarity present, the likelihood of an efficient 
currency area increases. 
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3.3.5 Application of the optimum currency area model: Europe  
Europe is probably the first region that comes to mind when thinking of a fixed 
exchange rate area involving many countries. As we know most of Europe has its own 
common currency, the euro. We can apply the theory presented earlier to the euro area. 
Although measuring the gains and losses of entering a fixed exchange rate area is not a 
correct science, some key numbers will give an indication. As the theory presented, the 
degree of integration is essential. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The Optimum Currency Area theory focuses on the effects of asymmetric shocks in 
the economy. A way of applying the theory to Europe is to address the frequency and 
importance of such shocks to find out if they are a serious cause of concern. The best way to 
speculate in this area is through analyzing the past which is by no means perfect, but it can 
serve as a guideline. Analyzing the use of national currencies to deal with shocks before the 
establishment of the EMU will be an appropriate way of doing this. It is important to note that 
changing the exchange rate is not always the result of asymmetric shocks, but also 
inflationary policies. Figure 5 is an overview based on the following question: ―Based on past 
experience, how much would European countries have adjusted their exchange rates vis-à-vis 
the center currency to deal with asymmetric shocks relevant to the three classic economic 
OCA principles of Mundell, Kenen and McKinnon?‖(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 330) 
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Figure 5: OCA index 
Source: (Figure 11.8, Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 331) 
An interesting note from this figure is that the all of the “worst”-scoring countries 
appearing as non-members at the bottom of the figure are now new members of the EU. The 
difficult process of transition towards a market economy illustrates their low scores. (Baldwin 
& Wyplosz, 2009)  
Openness to trade is essential in the theory and is the criterion presented by 
McKinnon. In smaller economies most of the goods that are produced and consumed are 
traded on the international market. In these cases changes in the exchange rate of the small 
country has no real effect because it is already adjusted into domestic prices. As expected, 
smaller countries tend to have a larger degree of trade internationally because of a small home 
market. This somewhat explains why the small countries throughout history have been the 
strongest supporters of a monetary union. Another measure of openness is trade intensity, 
measured by proportions of trade traded with a center country for old members of the union or 
with the euro area for new members. Most European countries have a satisfying amount of 
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trade in this category, making them eligible for joining a monetary union. (Baldwin & 
Wyplosz, 2009) 
There are also statistics present involving the Kenen criterion that states that 
diversification of trade reduces the impact of asymmetric shocks, and that countries with 
similar production patterns enjoy less asymmetric shocks. A study divides trade into three 
general parts: agriculture, minerals and manufacturing. Again the comparison is made with a 
center country (Germany) for old members and the Eurozone for new members. There are few 
clear patterns here, other than the fact that two countries (Latvia and Denmark) that have not 
yet adopted the euro score the highest in dissimilarity of trade. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The labor mobility criterion proposed by Robert Mundell is important when measuring 
integration. Movement of labor to maximize employment in the economy is a powerful tool. 
Full mobility, meaning a sudden movement when economic incentives change, will never be 
doable in reality. The reason for this is because moving from one area to another involves 
risks to concern including possible unemployment, family issues, career issues, cultural 
differences, nationalism and a wide variety of other concerns. Getting another job is not like 
changing buying behavior from one product to another – it involves many issues to consider 
which not necessarily involve economic incentives. One way of measuring labor mobility is 
through the percentage of foreign-born population in comparison to total population. This is 
done in figure 6 (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009): 
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Figure 6: Foreign-born population as a percentage of total population, 2005 
Source: (Figure 11.12, Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 335) 
A general tendency in this table is that most of the EU countries have a lower 
percentage of foreign-born people in their population than most other countries they can be 
associated with. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
When compared with the US, Europe has greater regional unemployment differences 
which indicate lower degree of labor mobility. Also a study showed that in the 1990s people 
in the US switched regions a lot more often than people in a few selected European countries. 
This is true despite lesser border barriers since the creation of the union. The reason is greater 
cultural and language differences between countries in Europe than for instance between 
regions in the US. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
Another way of measuring labor mobility is internal migration, which means moving 
within the country. When compared to a currency area of a similar size such as the US, EU 
countries score low also in this respect, as can be seen in figure 7 below. What is even more 
discouraging when it comes to the term labor mobility is that only 5% of Europeans move for 
professional reasons. Personal reasons seem to be the dominant factor when Europeans move. 
(Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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Figure 7: Internal migration across regions as a percentage of working-age population 
Source: (Figure 11.13, Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 336) 
Some reasons why Europeans generally are rather immobile are easy to explain. 
Cultural and lingual barriers can be hard to overcome. Other, less visible issues can include 
differences in welfare systems. However when moving internally within the country these 
issues are eliminated. Still the Europeans seem less willing to move internally when for 
instance compared with the US. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
From this analysis by Baldwin and Wyplosz it becomes evident that the Labor 
mobility criterion is far from fulfilled in the Optimum Currency Area theory.  
When it comes to Fiscal transfers, the budget of the EU is too small to be efficient. 
The budget is approximately 1% of the GDP, and is spent on operating expenses, agricultural 
policies as well as support for the poorer regions. No transfer system to neutralize shocks is in 
place in the EU, and is not likely to come in the near future unless serious changes are made 
in the EU budget. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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There are also little homogenous preferences in policy-decisions across Europe. There 
are vast differences in how they are dealing with economic events throughout different 
European institutions, which can explain why there are differences in economic measures 
such as debt and inflation. A strong European Union which sets restrictions upon its members 
may improve these conditions.  This is not an easy process because of the nationalism versus 
solidarity problem. There are strong opposition against joint decisions for all members, 
especially among older members and in particular the Nordic countries. It is natural to think 
that this is because of trust towards the national government, because more unstable 
economies from newer members are more positive towards centralized control. They may 
also feel that they will gain from common welfare policies, which the Nordic countries are 
strongly against according to a poll of 2008.  (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009)  
Another obvious way of measuring the integration between European countries is to 
look at the degree of Intra-European Trade. That is trade of goods and services between 
European countries. At the launch of the euro in 1999 the general volume of trade exported to 
the other EU countries was between 10 and 20 percent for the majority of EU countries. This 
level of intra-European trade alone does not justify the immense impact of launching a joint 
monetary system (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). 
Certain trade barriers from before might have influenced the level of intra-European 
trading. Many of those were removed in 1992, and often it takes time to adjust after such 
liberalization. Price differences have decreased during the 1990’s, although there still are 
major differences in price in Europe. One study finds no evidence of further decrease in price 
differences after the adoption of the euro. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009) 
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Figure 8: EU27 exports and imports by main partner 
Source: (Figure 15.1, Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 451)  
Since the creation of the EMU there has been a trend of increased intra-European 
trade, which means increased integration. Figure 8 depicts the situation in 2007. From this, 
one can see that two-thirds of the EU27 exports are exported to other EU27 countries. When 
adding the EFTA countries of Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein in addition to 
Turkey, it becomes three-quarters. Outside Europe the main trade partners are North America 
and Asia.  (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
When comparing the situation in 1999 to that in 2007 it is easy to see a massive 
increase in intra-European trade. It is however important to note that the 2007 figure includes 
the introduction of the eight countries from Eastern Europe in 2004, which of course will 
boost the level of intra-EU trade. 
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3.3.6 Criticism of the OCA-theory 
The foundation of the Optimum Currency Area theory lies on the idea that demand for 
certain products can shift from one country to another. A question that is naturally raised is 
whether these shifts are less likely to occur in a monetary union. There are conflicting 
opinions on this, one by the European Commission and another by Paul Krugman. (Grauwe, 
2009) 
The European Commission states that these types of shocks are less likely to happen in 
a monetary union. The opinion here is that the high degree of intra-industry trade and 
economies of scale in the European market will lead to a situation where countries trade the 
same types of products with each other. The shocks in the market will then more likely effect 
more than one country rather than just one country alone. This is a symmetric shock. As 
presented in the theory demand shocks for one country alone is more dramatic for that 
country than a shock for the region as a whole. (Grauwe, 2009) 
The other view comes from Paul Krugman. He emphasizes that the push for 
economies of scale will lead to more concentration of industries. This is exemplified by the 
automobile industry in the US, where a staggeringly high amount of production is located in 
the Midwest area. With the US being more integrated than Europe, greater concentration can 
be an e ffect of more integration. Because of this concentration the demand shocks for an 
industry will likely represent asymmetric shocks for single countries because a country or 
region might specialize in a certain industry. (Grauwe, 2009) 
Both arguments are reasonable and have good points.  One issue that points in favor of 
the European commission view is that when a region becomes more integrated, borders 
between countries are not as important as before. The result is that concentration of an 
industry will more likely than not pass national borders. For instance, the perfect place to 
concentrate an industry can be in Germany and France at the same time, and thus demand 
shocks in that industry will influence both countries. (Grauwe, 2009) 
It is not known for sure what the effect will be of a monetary union on integration, but 
it is believed that it will increase the integration in that region. Also it is suggested that 
economic integration reduces the likelihood of asymmetric shocks. These assumptions seem 
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reasonable but it is still uncertainty concerning the magnitude of these relationships. (Grauwe, 
2009) 
There are also well-known differences in labor markets across countries, and these 
will most likely not fade through a monetary union. It would firstly require centralized 
supranational unions because they are different from country to country. Secondly monetary 
policies are not the only tool a national government has to influence employment. Generating 
jobs in the public sector financed through debt is an example. (Grauwe, 2009) 
Additionally financial markets from country to country differ. This increases the risk 
of asymmetric shocks. The differences are mostly due to different legislations from country to 
country although this is not exclusively the case. Differences in monetary policies further 
widened the gap between different financial markets in the EU. Especially high inflation vs. 
low inflation seems to be important. Inflation has a dramatic effect on the investment in long-
term bonds, in a negative way. With a high inflation there is significantly less investment in 
the long-term bond market. Countries with high inflation have more of their debt located in 
short-term debt. Italy can be an example of this before the introduction of the EMU. An 
interest increase affected Italy greatly in the short term because of their high inflation and thus 
high level of short-term debt, while other countries had little short term problems of an 
increase in the interest rate. This is an asymmetric shock because two countries react very 
differently to an “outside” shock. After the EMU these differences have disappeared because 
of similar monetary policies. Differences in legal systems are still present though and 
continue to have an effect on financial markets. Legal systems as of now are more rigid and 
more political integration from the EU is the only permanent solution to these more 
fundamental differences. (Grauwe, 2009) 
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Chapter 4: The Euro at the Present 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is well known by everyone that the euro area has had its fair share of challenges in 
recent times. The recession that struck the world in the late 2000s was a global phenomenon 
that not only affected the US as it might have seemed by some media coverage. Europe 
suffered as well although the focus was mainly on the US at first. At the moment we 
constantly hear of European countries struggling. All Europeans have felt the effect of the 
economic downturn but certain countries, especially the southern ones, have been struggling 
more.  
At the same time, the euro has been subject to criticism lately. Some economists 
believe that the euro currency as it works right now is not sustainable. Prophecies of its death 
have been increasing in numbers as more and more European countries have revealed that 
they are having tough times handling their debt. There is a fear of a domino-effect if one of 
the major economies in Europe has to surrender to their high debt. Arguments involve saying 
that the currency union works better in theory than in practice.  
This part of the thesis will provide an overview of the financial crisis of the late 2000s 
with special emphasis on Europe. Central elements of the current debate surrounding the 
currency union will also be presented along, with a section covering a possible solution to the 
current situation.  
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4.2 The Ongoing Recession in Europe 
 
The economic recession of the late 2000s was the deepest economic downturn since 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. It was similar to other economic downturns throughout 
history. The allowance of irresponsible spending and lack of regulations were key factors. 
The warning signs were there, but the belief that “this time is different” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009) (a term introduced by Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart which also happens to be 
the title of their latest book, explaining the thought process before economic crises) made 
most people ignore them, and pushed the world into recession. The lack of regulations created 
an environment that allowed, or even rewarded, irresponsible economic behavior.  
The massive increase in innovation in the financial system had a great impact on the 
crisis. The reality globally was that since the 1980s the innovation in the financial markets 
made it increasingly easier to perform financial transactions globally in the brink of a second, 
through computers and a range of other devices. The securitization market became 
increasingly larger and importantly for the run of the crisis it entered the mortgage market. 
This created principal/agent problems that placed the risk elsewhere than at the people issuing 
the mortgages. The mortgage market became more and more complex and thus decreased the 
transparency in the industry. (Knoop, 2010)  
The global unsustainable trade imbalances were another cause of the crisis. The 
United States was performing massive trade deficits. These were made possible by budget 
surpluses of developed countries such as Germany and Japan, developing countries such as 
China and South Korea and the Middle Eastern countries. Such imbalances found place 
within the European continent as well. Germany ran budget surpluses financed by deficits in 
Britain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. The surplus was also made possible 
through keeping down wages that limited domestic demand and boosted the exports. (Onaran, 
2010) 
The collapse of the infamous sub-prime mortgage market in the US triggered the 
global crisis. This market was the market for mortgages for people with low credit-ratings in 
USA. When the bubble burst and large banks that had invested in this market were failing it 
influenced the world negatively, not only USA. The role of USA as the biggest consumer in 
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the world had its impact on exporters globally. Results worldwide were generally a massive 
increase in unemployment and ordinary people losing the value of their homes.  
The crisis made an impact across the Atlantic as well. The crisis shed light upon major 
flaws of the financial systems throughout the globe, also in Europe. Bank failures were 
common, most notably was the Northern Rock in the United Kingdom as one of the first 
banks admitting troubles. It culminated in a bank-run, something rarely seen in the UK. 
What we have seen happened after the recession entered the private sector is a 
“movement” of the crisis from the private financial sector to the public sector. Through heavy 
intervention in the market in order to stabilize the situation the public tax money has been 
spent generously. According to Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics at Stern School of 
Business in New York, the “socialization of private losses and fiscal laxity aimed at 
stimulating economies in a slump have led to a dangerous build-up of public deficits and debt. 
So the recent global financial crisis is not over; it has instead reached a new and more 
dangerous stage‖ (Roubini, 2010, p. 34) 
A few years after the crisis suddenly broke out it seems to be a general consensus that 
the crisis is not over – just moved from one place to another. Roubini believes from the quote 
above that it is even more dangerous than the initial phase of the crisis. He also has an elegant 
phrase where he states that ―The progression is clear: first came rescue of private firms, and 
now comes the rescue of the rescuers – that is, governments‖. (Roubini, 2010) 
It is also clear that this part of the crisis has been extra challenging for the Eurozone as 
an economic area with a wide variety of countries sharing the same currency, but lacking the 
political integration other countries have in order to perform swift intervention in the 
economy.  
―What started as the Subprime Crisis in 2007 and morphed in the Global Credit Crisis 
in 2008 has become the Euro Crisis in 2009. ― (Eichengreen, 2009b) 
This quote by euro-critic Barry Eichengreen suggests that the financial crisis has 
turned into being an exclusive Euro Crisis. While this might be an exaggeration it is without 
doubt certain that the Eurozone has had unique challenges because of the EMU. As explained 
earlier in the theory part of the thesis, the presence of asymmetric shocks poses problems for a 
currency union. Adjusting the interest rates to cushion the shock becomes impossible for a 
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single country within the union because of the lack of independence. Asymmetric shocks will 
pose a greater threat to countries in a fixed exchange rate regime.  
Globally the economy is recovering at the present. Most economic figures are pointing 
upwards and the majority of economists believe that the bottom of the recession has been 
reached. The problem in Europe however is the large government deficits and debt levels by 
the region as a whole and by some countries in particular.  
 
 
Figure 9: General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP 
Source: (Eurostat, 2011a) 
Figure 9 shows the government debt levels of 2010 as a percentage of the GDP for the 
European countries with data available on Eurostat. The euro area 17 bar to the very left of 
the figure includes Estonia which was included in the Eurozone at the 1
st
 of January 2011. 
The euro area 16 bar excludes Estonia which was not in the Eurozone in 2010, the year these 
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statistics are gathered from. The European Union bar includes all the 27 members of the 
union. Whether one includes Estonia in the euro area statistics from 2010 or not, the Eurozone 
average debt level was slightly above 85% in either case. (Eurostat, 2011a) 
The debt levels are generally high with many countries around the 80% mark. Some 
countries’ debt levels are around or above 100% of their GDP which implies that the value of 
all goods and services produced annually equals the value of the governments’ debt, which of 
course is a critical amount. The most severe situation is undoubtedly in Greece, a country 
followed closely by the world community at the moment because of rumors of debt defaulting 
and an exit out of the Eurozone. Whatever the speculations it is easy to acknowledge the 
seriousness of the situation – Greece had, as shown in figure 9, an incredible 2010 debt to 
GDP ratio of above 140%. The country that faced the largest deficit in 2010 however was 
Ireland with a deficit of 32.4 % of GDP. (Eurostat, 2011b) 
A term called “PIIGS” has been created in the discussion over the crisis in Europe, 
reflecting the countries with the most severe problems. These are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain and they have been the main recipients of the rescue package that Roubini 
names “the mother of all bailouts‖ (Roubini, 2010, p. 34) from the EU and IMF. (Roubini, 
2010) 
The package came by in May 2010 and included €750 billion in loans made available 
for countries facing liquidity problems. This came in addition to the previous €110 billion 
package for Greece. The total amount of it together was then €860 billion, or above $1 
trillion. (Gros & Mayer, 2010) 
The situation in Europe is monitored closely by the world community. News is 
flooding with rumors of countries defaulting on their debt or leaving the Eurozone and the 
potential catastrophic consequences that these scenarios might have. The situation feeds an 
ongoing heated debate that is presented in the next section of the thesis.  
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4.3 The Debate over the Currency Union 
 
Background        
The criticism against the EMU has roots way before the introduction of the euro. 
Already before the planning phase when there was just loose talk of the EMU, the monetary 
union was subject to critical voices. 
Many US economists have always been especially negative towards the idea of a 
common currency across Europe. At the time when the monetary union was in the planning 
phase US economists voiced their opinion, both Federal Reserve economists and academic 
economists. The Federal Reserve economists were generally more positive of the EMU than 
what was the case among academic economists. (Jonung & Drea, 2010) 
The optimum currency area argument, the Maastricht Treaty, and fiscal federalism 
were “popular” features to criticize among the academic economists during the time before 
implementation of the currency union. The discussion on the Maastricht Treaty mainly 
revolved around the speed of entry of the member states. It was thought that the most 
reasonable way of achieving monetary integration was through creating “groups” of countries 
entering the EMU at different times depending on their chance to meet the convergence 
criteria. A general consensus seemed to involve the unlikelihood of having all the twelve 
member states join the EMU at the same time at launch date in 1999. Another argument 
among the academics was the danger of not including a federal fiscal system in the Maastricht 
Treaty. (Jonung & Drea, 2010) 
The Optimum Currency Area theory and its criteria that were presented in the theory 
section of this thesis has been the base for much of the criticism of the EMU. Eichengreen 
(Eichengreen, 1991) found out in a study in 1991 that exchange rate variability was higher in 
Europe than in the United States, and that the United States was superior to Europe in labor 
mobility and thus implying that Europe were not an optimum currency area. Other studies 
concluded similarly. (Jonung & Drea, 2010) 
Another point on the agenda was the absence of a fiscal federalist system to neutralize 
asymmetric shocks within Europe. The United States had a well-functioning system for this 
and studies found that fiscal transfers had significantly reduced the impact of regional shocks 
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in the economy. It was also assumed that Europe would face more severe regional shocks than 
what would be the case in the United States. (Jonung & Drea, 2010) 
Later in the process when it became clear that the euro was to become a reality the 
debate somewhat switched. In the beginning it was said that the euro could not happen at all. 
After acknowledging that it actually would happen, the American economists continued to 
voice skepticism and said that it was a bad idea. Many of the same arguments as earlier were 
dominant. The argument stating that the EMU was made on the basis of politics and not 
economics was still to be heard as well as the lack of an optimum currency area.  Optimism 
among some of the American economists was to be found however; the effect of the EMU 
itself as a booster of integration was unknown and could have been underestimated.  (Jonung 
& Drea, 2010) 
After the euro went into practice and had existed for some years without large 
problems, the criticism somewhat dried out. Firm critics were still dubious to the idea arguing 
using the OCA theory but the euro surviving without many of the predicted problems made 
the pressure from the mass lessen. (Jonung & Drea, 2010) 
The financial crisis of the late 2000s has underlined some of the weaknesses of the 
EMU as it works in the present, and the criticism is now flourishing again. Many of the critics 
from before are now voicing their skepticism and concern for the future of the monetary 
union in Europe. The criticism today still has relevance to the Optimum Currency Area 
theory. Many of the central points of this theory represent the core of the current debate. Once 
again it is claimed that the degree of integration is crucial for a currency union to prevail. 
Many of the arguments used 10-20 years ago are still used today. 
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Criticism by Paul Krugman 
Paul Krugman is a well-known and respected economist worldwide. He won the 
famous “Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 
2008”. This was given to on the basis of "his analysis of trade patterns and location of 
economic activity". (nobelprize.org, 2011) 
He is a regular columnist at the New York Times. In January 2011 he expressed his 
concern for the situation in Europe in an article called ―Can Europe Be Saved?‖ (Krugman, 
2011) 
He begins by stating that during the first phase of the crisis the European economy 
was showing its social advantages in dealing with the crisis. Europe faced a similar shock in 
the economy as that of the US, but with seemingly less social consequences. Regulations 
governing labor security and unemployment benefit programs ensured that the social 
consequences in the first phase of the crisis were less than what was the case in the US, he 
says. (Krugman, 2011) 
During the second phase of the crisis Krugman believes the weaknesses of the 
European model are being underlined. He blames the euro for the current problems: “the 
architects of the euro, caught up in their project’s sweep and romance, chose to ignore the 
mundane difficulties a shared currency would predictably encounter — to ignore warnings, 
which were issued right from the beginning, that Europe lacked the institutions needed to 
make a common currency workable.‖ (Krugman, 2011, p. 1) 
In this quote Krugman conveys that the idea of a monetary union in Europe was a bad 
idea from the start, and questions the decision-makers’ consideration of the economic 
arguments behind the creation of the euro. The lack of basic institutions had sealed the euro’s 
fate right from the beginning according to Krugman. 
Further in the article Paul Krugman addresses the recurring argument of the lack of 
flexibility in the monetary union. He exemplifies it with Spain, a country facing a difficult 
situation at the moment. During the housing boom before the crisis wages and prices were 
pushed upwards and now Spain needs to cut the costs back down. This is a painful process for 
a country without its own currency, as wages are rigid. No one in Spain is interested in being 
the first one having to accept a lower wage. If Spain hypothetically had its own currency a 
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devaluation would be an easier way of restoring the situation; studies have shown that a 
devaluation offers an instant reduction in relative wages, Krugman says. It is an instant 
reduction in the wages instead of doing it “one-by-one”. (Krugman, 2011) 
Krugman then starts an interesting comparison between Ireland and the state of 
Nevada in the US. They share many similar characteristics: Both have populations of a few 
million people and they are heavily dependent on trade with neighboring areas whether it 
being Europe for Ireland or other US states for Nevada. Both were also struck similarly by the 
crisis; large housing bubbles burst and they face a similar level of unemployment at the 
moment. Yet the situation in Ireland seems much more serious. The reason for that, Krugman 
argues, is that much of the spending that Nevada is dependent on is paid federally by United 
States as a whole while Ireland has to pay for the loss by its own without any help from the 
rest of Europe. Another advantage of Nevada that Krugman emphasizes is the likelihood of 
the unemployment issues being solved by migration – or labor mobility. Historically 
Americans have been extremely mobile and unemployment in Nevada will likely be reduced 
to the US average within a few years. (Krugman, 2011) 
The above paragraph illustrates the continuous actuality of the Optimum Currency 
Area theory. The fact that much of Nevada’s spending is paid for federally is in effect a 
fulfillment of the fiscal transfers criteria in the theory. The greater degree of migration in the 
US in comparison with Europe suggests greater labor mobility, another important criterion in 
the theory that helps neutralize the effects of asymmetric shocks in the economy. The 
criticism of EMU from Krugman derives from inferior integration in Europe when compared 
with USA: “America, we know, has a currency union that works, and we know why it works: 
because it coincides with a nation — a nation with a big central government, a common 
language and a shared culture. Europe has none of these things, which from the beginning 
made the prospects of a single currency dubious.‖ (Krugman, 2011, p. 6) 
Paul Krugman also questions what happened with the European bond market after the 
launch of the euro, exemplified by Greece. Greece has a controversial history when it comes 
to debt defaults and inflation, and this has been notable in their interest rates; investors 
justifiably would only buy bonds from Greece if the Greek government paid back with an 
interest rate reflecting the investment risk, which in practice meant an interest rate 
significantly higher than “safer” European governments such as Germany. This pattern 
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changed when the euro came about however. The market seemed to believe that the European 
Central Bank would minimize the risk of inflation and thus the risk premium for buying 
Greek bonds was decreasing. Similar scenarios were observed in other European traditional 
high-risk countries: confidence in the euro as a market stabilizer made these markets seem 
almost as secure as for example Germany. The interest rates converged. In effect this led to 
heavy borrowing for the traditional high-risk countries which led to an overheated economy. 
When the crisis set in and the housing market collapsed, the nature of the European welfare 
system posed great costs to the governments in the form of unemployment benefits. The 
construction industry that had been a massive part of the economy before the crisis stagnated 
and the result was mass unemployment. The culmination of these reasons explained why 
investors lost faith in these markets, Krugman says. (Krugman, 2011) 
Finally in explaining the concern of the current situation Krugman mentions USA and 
Britain. These countries have proportionally comparable budget deficits to the struggling 
European economies but they do not struggle with the same loss in confidence. The reason is 
that they do not have the euro and may use monetary policy to restore the situation. The 
countries in the Eurozone however have to painfully deflate their economies to restore the 
wage levels back to normal according to Krugman. This of course will raise the value of the 
debt which will further increase the reluctance towards spending money, downgrading 
economic activity even more. Even less confidence by investors will be the result which will 
increase the interest further. It becomes a negative spiral, Krugman concludes. (Krugman, 
2011) 
This article by Paul Krugman highlights the core of the ongoing debate. The OCA 
theory still has great relevance. The criteria such as for instance labor mobility and fiscal 
transfers are not nearly as fulfilled in Europe as in the US. Many economists believe that this 
is a great threat to the monetary union.  
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Criticism by Barry Eichengreen   
A name that seems to be recurring in this debate is Barry Eichengreen. Eichengreen 
frequently publishes articles and commentaries on world economic events at the forum for 
leading world economists called VoxEU.org. He is Professor of Economics and Political 
Science of the University of California Berkeley (VoxEU.org). He was skeptical of the 
grounds for establishing the monetary union before it went into practice, and the recent events 
have of course not made him change his mind. 
In the article ―Was the Euro a mistake?‖ (Eichengreen, 2009b) he suggests that a part 
of what we are currently observing in the Eurozone is exactly what American economists 
warned Europeans about in the 1990s – asymmetric shocks. ―Countries like Greece with debt 
and deficit problems have been singled out by investors who are now fleeing everything that 
emits the slightest whiff of risk. Similarly, the countries with the biggest housing bubbles, such 
as Ireland and Spain, are now suffering the most serious slumps as their bubbles deflate 
problems ramify through their financial systems.‖ (Eichengreen, 2009b) 
He also states that from the beginning when the idea came about, critics believed that 
if such shocks would hit heavily indebted countries they would have problems without a fiscal 
transfer system. The only option in such circumstances would be deflation and double figures 
of unemployment for the countries involved. He adds that the shock with asymmetric 
implications recently experienced will become more symmetric as time goes by and 
appropriate responses in the market has to be made. There might be some degree of 
asymmetry but all the countries in the Eurozone are likely to be affected by the shock 
(Eichengreen, 2009b). It is useful to notice that this article was written before the enormous 
bailout package of May 2010 which he somewhat anticipated. 
In another article written a few months later called ―The crisis and the Euro‖ 
(Eichengreen, 2009a), Eichengreen again discusses the role of the euro as a problem when 
facing asymmetric shocks. This time he also focuses on positives for being in the currency 
union however, or more precisely the risks of potential exit. There is a temptation to exit the 
union for certain members he acknowledges, but a fear of being discriminated against 
economically is significant. A devaluation in order to reclaim competitiveness from a country 
leaving the union could be seen as a form of betrayal and an “exporting of problems”. He 
says: ―More generally, the current downturn, like all downturns, has intensified the pressure 
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for governments to support embattled domestic producers with concessional loans and 
subsidies. Those policies threaten Europe’s signal economic achievement, the creation of a 
true single market in which producers in EU countries compete on an equal footing.‖ 
(Eichengreen, 2009a, p. 8). He continues by saying that there is no mentioning of an exit 
option for a member when it comes to the EMU. The only option would then be to leave the 
entire European Union something Eichengreen believes would not be taken lightly by a 
member.  
Eichengreen also mentions that it is not necessarily true that it will be easier for a 
country to have control over their finances through a reintroduction of the national currency. 
He says that previous studies have suggested that interest rates for sovereign bonds rise faster 
in relation to the budget deficits/debt ratios in countries outside the Eurozone. The investors 
seem to regard the governance from the ECB positively when deciding their investments. He 
finally reminds readers of the immense technical barriers of such a drastic movement. All 
mortgages and credit-card debts would need to be readjusted. He questions which government 
that would be willing to put their country through these possible risks. (Eichengreen, 2009a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Optimistic views 
Although it is evident that the Eurozone at the present are in the midst of a major crisis 
and facing numerous challenges, something everyone seems to agree with, there is also 
optimism to be found. Erik Jones expresses such a view in the article ―The Euro and the 
financial Crisis‖ (Jones, 2009). 
In this article Jones believes it is useful to look at the broader picture of the situation. 
He criticizes the tendency that the commentators have of looking at the economic data 
exclusively. When doing that a dark picture of the situation appears, he admits, but the 
situation is not as critical as some articles seem to believe: ―The closer one looks at the 
problem, the worse it becomes, particularly if the economic data are to be believed. 
Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that the situation is much better than most 
commentators are willing to admit. The trick is to dissect the economic analysis, much of 
which not only exaggerates the significance of recent trends but also underestimates or 
ignores the costs and benefits of the most likely alternatives.‖ (Jones, 2009, p. 42) 
When analyzing the current events Jones emphasizes that the currency union is not as 
weak as many seem to fear and he also claims that the alternatives of the euro are far worse. 
―Far from engendering conflicts, the single currency has diffused them. Along the way, it has 
also insulated politicians from being forced to make inevitably unpopular and difficult 
choices. Thus, the Eurozone is more likely to get larger than it is to get smaller.‖ (Jones, 
2009, p. 42) 
Jones follows by comparing Italy to Britain – one economy within the Eurozone and 
another outside. When comparing the relative labor costs of the two economies one can find 
interesting implications. From 2000 onwards, which was close to the start of the currency 
union, Britain’s competitiveness in terms of labor costs have remained much the same while 
Italy scored worse in the same measure. This would suggest that Britain had profited from not 
entering the currency union. However when using the same measure from 1990 onwards the 
overall image is turned up-side down. In the transition phase to the monetary union Italy 
focused their efforts on gaining entry and Britain, being outside of the monetary union, did 
not emphasize the convergence criteria. The result was a rise in the relative labor costs for 
Britain in comparison with Italy. (Jones, 2009) 
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While this is a rather narrow scope the preceding example reminds us how economic 
data can be “manipulated” in order to end up with a preferred result. By choosing a different 
year as the base year the results are completely different, and it can be hard to know which 
ones to trust. Obviously both are correct – but which one gives the more accurate description 
of changes in competitiveness, Jones asks. (Jones, 2009) 
Jones also mentions the advantage of greater liquidity within the Eurozone: ―One of 
the major benefits of joining the eurozone is that it has offered members both greater liquidity 
and a lower cost of capital. For highly indebted countries such as Italy, Greece or Belgium, 
this meant that they could borrow larger amounts at longer maturities and lower prices in 
―domestic‖ currency. During the months leading up to the start of the single currency, 
interest rates on long-term sovereign-debt obligations across the eurozone converged to 
within one-half of one percent.‖ (Jones, 2009, p. 47) 
It is rather peculiar to compare the above statement to what Paul Krugman said in his 
criticism. Krugman claimed that the convergence of perceived risk was a dangerous trap, 
while Erik Jones addresses it as one of the major advantages for members of the Eurozone. 
The same argument is used both for arguing in favor of the EMU, as well as against the 
currency union. 
As many others, Erik Jones uses Greece as an example for explaining the worsening of 
the situation. The Greek government bonds yield a much higher interest rate compared with 
Germany at the moment as the creditworthiness goes down. Despite this Jones focuses on the 
alternative being worse: ―The Greek government’s default risk is increasing, but the point to 
note is that it would surely be higher outside the single currency than it is now. Although the 
yield differential with Germany has increased, this is largely due to the fact that while Greek 
sovereign-debt yields have been relatively stable, German sovereign-debt yields have gone 
down. As a result, Greece is still paying a lower interest rate on its long-term debt than it was 
just before it joined the single currency in 2000. The relative cost has increased but the 
absolute cost has not.‖ (Jones, 2009, p. 48) 
The problems are of course at the present a lot worse than when Jones published his 
article in 2009. The differences in yields between Germany and Greece are enormous. It is 
hard to say if the problems would have escalated outside the Eurozone. 
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Jones states that the countries within the Eurozone benefit from the liquidity in the 
European market, and claims that leaving the Eurozone would pose higher borrowing costs 
and volatility in the exchange rates than what is true at the moment. (Jones, 2009) 
Erik Jones ends his paper by saying countries outside the Eurozone envy the situation 
inside it especially when it comes to the liquidity issue. He refers to the EMU as a protection 
against the events that shook the world economy in the financial crisis. Removal of exchange 
rate volatility, eliminating the need to make unpopular decisions, lower cost of borrowing and 
providing incentives for reasonable economic behavior are benefits that he believes countries 
inside the currency union can enjoy. He does not neglect the fact that the Eurozone are 
experiencing tough challenges however, but he chooses to focus on the advantages of being 
inside the Eurozone instead of with the alternative. 
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Opimism from the European Central Bank 
The European Central Bank focuses on the achievements already made by the EMU in 
the conference paper ―The Euro at Ten – Lessons and Challenges‖ (ECBank, 2009). This was 
a conference with focus on the euro at the ten year anniversary of the EMU.  
In the conference paper Francesco Paolo Mongelli from the ECB and Charles Wyplosz 
from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva point out the main 
achievements. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The main achievement mentioned by the Maastricht Treaty was price stability. The 
major motivation behind the convergence criteria for countries entering the monetary union 
was price stability as well. The mentioned authors have analyzed the effect on the currency 
union on price stability. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
They present a table of inflation in the post-war decades in Eurozone countries and 
compare this with the level of inflation in the ten years that the euro has been active. The table 
shows only with certain exceptions that the inflation rates of the five decades before the 
launch of the euro have been higher than the inflation rates of the decade between 1999 and 
2008. Wyplosz and Mongelli do acknowledge that these results may come from the fact that 
when the inflation rates decline, the absolute difference in inflation rates will decrease 
subsequently which does not indicate that inflation rates have been converged. Through using 
the coefficient of the variation they find out that the inflation rates have in fact converged. 
They even find out that the dispersion of the inflation rates similar to the levels in the US, and 
more stable. The table for the inflation rates is presented below in figure 10. (Mongelli & 
Wyplosz, 2009) 
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Figure 10: Post-war inflation rates: in Europe ten-year annual averages 
Source:  (Table 1, Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 28) 
Mongelli and Wyplosz find the comparison with the US quite surprising. One reason 
they point out is different fiscal policies. In the US there are strict rules concerning states 
running deficits, while in Europe fiscal policy is something mostly done by the individual 
countries. Another reason is the assumption that Europe is more prone to asymmetric shocks 
than the US. There is also a possibility that the launch of the euro was not a period of 
equilibrium in the exchange rate market for Europe in comparison with the US, where states 
would likely have made adjustments a long time ago. Lastly it might be that exchange rate 
equilibriums have actually changed due to lower developed countries in Europe “catching up” 
with the higher developed ones. In the US there is more homogeneity of development 
between the states than what is the case between European countries.  (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 
2009) 
Mongelli and Wyplosz admit that it is hard to tell if the period between 1999 and 2008 
was a period characterized by less shocks than the previous period. No matter what the 
conclusion to that is, the price stability discussion is concluded with saying that the period 
with the financial crisis undoubtedly has a massive shock in the economy to deal with. ―The 
2007-08 combination of rising commodity prices (that subsequently declined rapidly) and the 
financial crisis amounts to a massive shock and a serious challenge for the ECB (as well as 
other central banks)‖. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 30) 
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On the euro’s influence on growth there previously was a fear that the ECB would 
fight inflation to such an extent that it would hinder economic growth. This turned out to be 
an unneeded fear however. The growth rates in the first decade of the euro are varying from 
one country to another, an indication that monetary policies did not have an effect on the 
outcome on growth according to Mongelli and Wyplosz. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The effects on trade are also being analyzed in the paper. The euro has probably 
increased the intra-European trade by 5%, something considered substantial by the authors 
seeing that the intra-European trade has risen for five decades in a row before implementation 
of the euro. This quoted paragraph sums up the conclusions by the authors on the trade effects 
of the euro: ―The value of imports and exports within the euro area increased from about 
26% of GDP in 1998, the year before the euro was introduced, to 33% of GDP in 2007. In the 
same period, intra-euro area services trade also went up, rising from 5% to 7% of GDP. 
Since 1998, the year-on-year growth of euro area exports of goods to the three EU15 
countries that have not adopted the euro has been 3% lower on average than the year-on-
year growth of exports within the euro area. Extra-euro area trade has grown more than 
intra-euro area trade, an indication that the euro has not had a trade-diversion effect, as was 
sometimes feared. Hence, there is no ―fortress-Europe‖‖. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009, p. 32) 
The euro has also resulted in beneficial welfare effects, it is claimed. The price 
stability and low interest rates have made it easier to manage high debts and the integration of 
trade has benefited both the consumers and the companies. The danger of attacks on national 
currencies has been removed as well. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
Furthermore, Mongelli and Wyplosz devote attention to what they believe are 
unfulfilled threats to the euro. Before the launch of the euro there was a lot of doubt in the 
euro’s ability to overcome certain challenges. 
One of these challenges was the credibility problem of the ECB. Skeptics feared that 
the ECB had to earn its credibility through proving itself and thus possible leading to a slow 
rise in credibility of the ECB. This would result in the market believing in high inflation, 
above the actual inflation rate, which would lead to a problematically high interest rate. This 
was cleverly dealt with by adopting the Deutche Bundesbank’s strategy, resulting in an 
inheritance of the Bundesbank’s credibility. (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
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Another of the unfulfilled threats as stated by the European Central Bank is the 
national fiscal policies, something that has always been at the center of the currency union 
debate. The Stability and Growth pact between countries in the Eurozone which requires that 
national deficits should not surpass 3% of GDP under normal conditions has enforced 
discipline, it is claimed. This is not a binding agreement but merely a guideline that has 
loosened up over the years as it was too rigid originally according to the authors. The 
extraordinary conditions needed to violate the pact have been broadened. (Mongelli & 
Wyplosz, 2009) 
The last point of unfulfilled threats pointed out by Mongelli and Wyplosz is the so 
called Walters Critique, stating that a unified monetary policy will result in a more 
expansionary policy in high inflation countries and the opposite in low inflation countries. As 
pointed out earlier in this section the inflation rates in the Eurozone have actually converged. 
(Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2009) 
A remark that needs to be made is that this conference was in late 2008 – a time where 
the international crisis had broken out, but the severity of the Eurozone was not perhaps 
known to the same degree that it is at the present. This does not neglect the accomplishments 
that the euro has made pointed out by the ECB however. The conference brings up some 
interesting arguments about the positive sides of the creation of the euro. 
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Summary of the debate 
The debate over the currency union is a debate that most likely will be going on a long 
time, at least until some kind of resolution to the crisis comes around. A currency union in 
Europe has without doubt both costs and benefits and there will always be critic voices heard. 
It is only natural that the debate has heated up right now during the greatest challenge of the 
EMU so far.  
The critics of the monetary union are mostly arguing with the basis of the Optimum 
Currency Area theory. According to them the lack of integration between the Eurozone 
countries makes the EMU tough to sustain. The lack of labor mobility and fiscal transfers in 
particular is the reason for this.  
There is a clear tendency from the critics to compare the Eurozone with USA. That is 
fair given similar sizes of the economies. When doing that everyone ends up with the same 
conclusion: USA is far more integrated than Europe economically, politically as well as 
culturally. That is no surprise however, given that the US is one country with the same 
language and for the most part a similar culture. There is also a national government 
performing many economic and political decisions for the individual states. Europe on the 
other hand includes many countries with completely different languages and cultures. In 
addition to that there is a lot more independence in political decisions for a European country 
than what would be the case for an American state. If the US is the benchmark for economic 
and political integration, Europe undoubtedly still has far to go. The fairness of comparing a 
single country with a continent having a common currency governed by a supranational 
organization in terms of integration is a question that of course can be raised. When doing 
such a comparison it is likely that Europe will always lag behind the US, unless Europe 
becomes a single country, something that is hard to imagine in the foreseeable future. 
The other side of the debate mostly consists of the accomplishment made by the euro, 
and the lack of realistic alternatives. It is clear that the cooperation of the euro has had 
favorable effects such as low inflation and an increase in trade within Europe. It has also 
provided a safe and stable currency for the countries involved. In addition the alternatives are 
not favorable according to the pro-euro arguers. The alternative national currencies will 
inevitably lead to politicians having to make unpopular choices. The liquidity provided in the 
Eurozone is also a positive feature it is said. 
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There are many voices in this debate but the arguments seem to be similar to the ones 
presented here. Generally speaking the OCA theory is the basis for the critics while the 
accomplishments made by the euro as well as the worse alternatives are arguments at the 
other side of the table. I have presented the main arguments on both sides of the debate in this 
section in order to shed light upon the benefits and costs of the currency union. It will be 
interesting to see how this debate evolves and what the outcome of the current struggles will 
be.  
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4.4 Possible Solution 
       
Some articles are devoted to finding a solution to the troubling situation at the 
moment. And by solution they mean a sustainable solution – one that will help the Eurozone 
overcome similar challenges that we are seeing now in the future. While the bailout package 
stimulating the economy given by the EU and the IMF is a reactive and a temporary solution 
to the problems, the authors of the articles I will be referring to in this section attempt to go to 
the root of the hardships.  
In the article “A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution: A 
Proposal‖ a panel of experts express their view on this issue: ―We agree that the euro area 
needs a mechanism for dealing with sovereign debt crises in an effective and predictable way. 
Even the most sophisticated and most effectively enforced set of fiscal rules will not eliminate 
the possibility of future debt crises in the euro area. One of the main problems of the crisis of 
2010 was clearly that policymakers had no game plan for dealing with it.‖ (Gianviti, 
Krueger, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, & Hagen, 2010) 
They propose a creation of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM), which 
they believe should consist of two pillars. The first pillar revolves around the need for 
negotiations between countries facing debt levels of an unsustainable nature and their 
creditors in order to reduce the present value of the debtor’s future payments, making the 
finances sustainable again. Legally there would be a need for a court to deal with these 
negotiations, and the authors suggest the European Court of Justice for such cases. The 
second pillar concerns rules for how to deal with financial aid for countries with liquidity 
problems. An institution for lending needs to become permanent. (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
The role of the ECRM should be to weigh the interest rate of the debtors up against the 
lenders’ as well as minimizing the moral hazard problems. This is a balance. The ECRM 
should not create incentives for governments to borrow irresponsibly, but the introduction of 
heavy penalties is not the way of doing this in a crisis situation either. Penalties will only 
worsen the financial situation for the penalized country. A fault of the response to the current 
crisis according to the authors has been lack of regulations for private creditors, which 
resulted in creating incentives to loan to struggling governments. (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
71 
 
The authors of this article also explain why there is such a need for a crisis 
mechanism. On the basis of comparing the EMU to the Gold Standard (which by now is 
considered one of the main reasons behind the severity of the Great Depression), the need for 
a mechanism for crisis handling is being justified. Many defaults were experienced in Europe 
during the Gold Standard and the Gold Standard system is similar to the EMU in the sense 
that a national government is not able to use high inflation to get out of the debt problems. 
Once again the issue of lack of monetary independence is raised. (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
The sovereign-debt problems we are now facing creates uncertainty and risk issues for 
bond holders. The enormous liabilities that the governments are facing create uncertainty 
through doubts whether they have the ability to ever pay back. Another source of uncertainty 
comes from what other bond holders might do with their bonds. In addition to this there is a 
specific type of uncertainty for the euro area: the uncertainty surrounding the financial 
assistance from other members of the Eurozone. This uncertainty will be reduced with a clear 
framework on how to handle such cases. This is of course an issue of solidarity versus 
responsibility for a country’s own finances something also mentioned in the OCA theory. In 
order for the uncertainty to be minimized through a crisis mechanism transparency is needed 
in the resolution process. (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
     Finally in the article a framework for what the mechanism should include is presented. The 
framework should include these elements according to the authors: 
 A clear pattern on how to start the resolution of debt. The rules should encourage early 
discussions between the creditors and debtors. The initiative should come from the 
debtor’s government, given the potentially large amount of creditors. 
 The ECRM should prevent the minority of creditors to take advantage of the majority. 
By rejecting the restructuring of debt the minority can hope that the majority in the 
end will merely buy them out. The mechanism preventing this can for instance use a 
majority voting system where the majority can make decisions on the behalf of 
smaller bondholders. 
 A mechanism that govern the negotiations, i.e a court. 
 Rules for providing credit to governments with liquidity issues.  
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     (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
The above is a general guideline for what this institution would need. In addition the 
authors have suggested a more specific framework based on these in the form of a proposal. 
The main points are that the mechanism exclusively should handle unsustainable debt, and if 
this is present, the mechanism should provide incentives for early negotiations between 
creditors and debtors. The sovereignty of debtors should be essential – it is they that would 
have to suggest such negotiations. The majority of creditors would also need to be able to 
negotiate and provide binding agreements upon the minority, and interference with contracts 
should generally not happen. Lastly the integrity of the whole process needs to be ensured by 
a neutral system handling disagreements. (Gianviti, et al., 2010) 
The article concludes with this sentence, implying that an institutional crisis 
mechanism is urgent: ―We have argued that the current architecture of European Monetary 
Union, which rests on the flawed assumption that sovereign-debt crises cannot happen, is 
incomplete and that EMU needs a crisis resolution mechanism – an ECRM.‖ (Gianviti, et al., 
2010, p. 29) 
Another article that proposes a solution is ―A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-
Area Debt Crisis‖ (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry, & Sapir, 2011). In this article the comprehensive 
solution as the authors call it will include three parts: 
 Recovery of the banking sector solidity 
 A solution of sovereign-debt crises 
 Implementation of a strategy that enforce growth and competitiveness in the Eurozone 
(Darvas, et al., 2011) 
In the section covering recovery of the banking the authors acknowledge that their 
information is not complete. However they still believe the risk of contagion of banking crises 
is manageable, and they assume that Greece is the only country in need of restructuring of 
their debt. At the same time the overall spillover risk is still somewhat unclear. The stress 
tests of banks that were published in July 2010 are not credible anymore given the recent 
developments in Irish banks. The authors suggest that new thorough and credible stress tests 
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need to be made, possibly not by the EU, and that the proper restructuring of banks are to be 
done where such measures are needed. (Darvas, et al., 2011) 
In the part covering the second of the three actions that need to be done to recover 
from the current crisis the obvious resolution of the sovereign debt crisis is presented. The 
calculations they refer to conclude that a major reduction in the Greek debt is needed, and 
preferably it should be done in a quick fashion. That is of course an action that would cause 
considerable controversy. The authors still believe that this needs to be done, and a change in 
the EU’s views is the only way to make it effective: ―In particular, a voluntary exchange will 
only be marginally effective as long as the EU sticks to its no-restructuring commitment 
because, if credible, this commitment is an incentive to hold rather than sell the asset. In 
order to make debt-exchange schemes effective, public authorities would need to convey to 
markets their determination to achieve a reduction of public debt to a sustainable 
level.‖(Darvas, et al., 2011, p. 10) 
A restructuring of the debt instead of a reduction through voluntary exchanges is 
another way of handling the sovereign debt crisis. If restructuring is done the authors of the 
second article refer to the first article cited in this section of the thesis as a reasonable method 
for negotiations. (Darvas, et al., 2011) 
The third and last part for providing a solution to the crisis was the encouragement of 
growth and competitiveness in Europe, and in the peripheral countries in particular. This is 
not done without social consequences. Because of the debt levels seen in some of these 
countries sustainability is only achieved through lower living standards and higher 
production. Policy should be used mainly for restoring employment and productivity. This is 
a time-consuming process and even when successful it will not significantly reduce the debt 
levels instantly. When much of the emphasis of private firms and governments is on reducing 
debt, the growth will decrease making it more difficult to pay the debt. With help from the EU 
the countries can be able to break out of this cycle. Right now the situation is unfavorable 
because of uncertainty. Households are reluctant towards spending and the cost of borrowing 
is high, because of uncertainty issues concerning the banks and possible default from 
governments. (Darvas, et al., 2011) 
Both the articles agree that some institutional changes need to be done in the 
Eurozone. The crisis we have seen would not have been as severe as what is the case now if 
74 
 
the measures suggested here would have been implemented beforehand. The ability to react 
quickly to economic shocks has been proven to be vital in economic crises, and to some 
extent Europe did not have this ability in this crisis. No institution for fiscal transfers is 
present in the Eurozone at the moment. The discussion on how to get out of the current 
problems is also one of ethics and solidarity – how much are the stronger economies willing 
to give up for the beneficial of the whole Eurozone? Is the no bailout principle of such an 
importance that it cannot be violated?  
What we are seeing in the media picture at the moment is a Greek economy in 
particular suffering vast social consequences while the stronger economies are reluctant to 
accept default, because it to some extent justifies the irresponsible economic policy that 
Greece has been running up until the crisis. The situation is not completely dark however. The 
problems have made the Eurozone cooperate extensively, creating rescue packages of loans 
aimed at restoring competitiveness in the struggling economies.  
Critics have said that this situation was inevitable under the current framework of the 
EMU. While this is the greatest challenge of the currency union so far, perhaps if needed 
adjustments are being made and the EMU actually survives the crisis, the Eurozone will 
bounce back stronger. Nevertheless there is no lack of future challenges for the Eurozone. The 
next chapter of the thesis is devoted to just that – the future of the Eurozone. 
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Chapter 5: The Future of the Euro 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This part of the thesis will be covering the future of the euro. At the present there is 
mass speculation in the media on this issue. There is some degree of skepticism as to whether 
or not the Eurozone are able to cope with the current situation. The bailout package of 2010 
does not affect the underlying causes of the crisis it is just a helping hand for troubled 
economies to regain their competitiveness. 
There is also a looming fear of the possible consequences of a default of a European 
country within the Eurozone. There are conflicting reports on how realistic a default really is. 
Some say it is inevitable while others say it is very unlikely. The most likely candidate for a 
default is undoubtedly Greece. At the same time the stronger European economies are hesitant 
to accepting a Greek debt default - after all Greece has created this mess themselves albeit 
through a controversial previous government. Some economists believe that a Greek default 
will cause them to leave the Eurozone, possibly jeopardizing the whole EMU. 
Many experts seem to believe that the Eurozone will need to undergo institutional 
changes in order to overcome the present challenges. The crisis has underlined the frailties of 
the system, which might need to change in order for it to not experience similar crises in the 
future. 
The truth is that no one is sure what will happen – it is impossible to predict the future. 
The EMU is a unique experiment as well in terms of the scale of the economies involved. 
There have been currency unions between countries before, but nothing near the complexity 
that we have seen in the EMU. The EMU represents something unique: A new currency 
shared by almost an entire continent of different countries. Looking at history to predict the 
future can sometimes be useful, although difficult in this case as there are no similar cases to 
analyze. As always however there are economists speculating and suggesting, and this section 
will provide an overview of the challenges ahead for the Eurozone as well as possible 
outcomes of the current tricky situation. 
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5.2 Challenges ahead 
 
The European Commission itself has in a paper covering the economic crisis of the 
late 2000s called “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses‖ 
(EuropeanCommission, 2009) identified the future policy challenges of the EU. In the paper 
they analyze the current crisis and the driving forces behind it, the consequences for Europe 
as well as how to respond to the crisis. They conclude by saying that the crisis we have seen 
underlines the importance of a framework for handling economic crises. It should include 
three blocks. (EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
The first one should be devoted to the prevention of crises. How to most efficiently 
execute macroeconomic policies and regulations to prevent new crises to occur is the 
reasoning. If a crisis occurs anyway, policies that promote competitiveness in the European 
market can help the Eurozone experience a faster recovery. (EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
The second block is called ―crisis control and mitigation‖. This section is proposed to 
minimize the damage of crises. Injections in order to prevent bank defaults and heavy social 
consequences of a crisis are the objectives of this section. Stability in the financial system is 
the goal. The coordination of this block needs to be done by the EU and not national 
governments in order to have full effect.  (EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
The third and final block is crisis resolution, aiming at closing the crisis at the lowest 
possible cost for the government. The removal of the temporary crisis management suggested 
in the second block is needed here. A sustainable crisis resolution is the goal, and as such 
moving away from the expansionary monetary policy that is reasonable in crises needs to be 
done. (EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
Planning for such a framework is set to start according to the paper. During the present 
crisis the EU had to use the existing mechanisms for crisis prevention. Looking back the 
European Commission admits that the current framework was insufficient, providing the 
severity of the crisis. EU crisis policies up until now have mostly been in the second block of 
control and mitigation; however adjustments in the first block of prevention have also been 
done after the crisis. Actions concerning the crisis resolution block for sustainable solutions 
have so far been missing and the analysis from the paper suggests that this is now becoming 
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increasingly urgent, especially in order to restore confidence in the market. 
(EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
It is clear that the policy responses made by the EU of this crisis, although reactive, 
were effective if they are to be compared with the Great Depression where contractive 
monetary policy was the response. However it is important that the EU develops a long-term 
perspective of crises resolution policies, in order to enhance the belief in the effectiveness of 
such a mechanism. (EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
The question is when to stop the fiscal stimulus to prevent debt from rising, creating 
an even less sustainable debt situation. That of course depends on how the economy recovers.  
Unfavorable tax increases for workers might be inevitable in some countries, but it is of 
course also important to not undermine the incentives to work. When signs of actual 
sustainable recovery are to be seen the focus should be shifted from fiscal stimulus to more 
fundamental structural reforms. To create a robust banking sector is perhaps the most 
important task. It should create an environment promoting growth and productivity. 
(EuropeanCommission, 2009) 
―Structural reforms should be directed to enhancing the economy's infrastructure 
capital, employing idle or underutilised labour resources and improving the use and 
development of new technologies. This requires government initiatives in the pursuit of 
investment in infrastructure (public or private), the development of skills, greater labour 
mobility (geographical or across industries and occupations) and innovation (including the 
development of low-carbon technologies). Now that the financial system takes a more 
conservative attitude to risk financing even allowing for recovery in the banking sector, the 
expected social rate of return on such investments easily exceeds their perceived private 
return.‖ (EuropeanCommission, 2009, p. 84) 
The commission suggests that the government should have a major role in these 
investments. This is reasonable because these investments create large social benefits for the 
society, while private returns on these investments are less. The restructuring of the banking 
sector also needs to be done at the lowest possible cost. (EuropeanCommission, 2009)  
All these policy changes that needs to be done have to be done coordinated with the 
whole of Europe. If this is not the case reforms might have negative local effects. 
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Mechanisms that are set up to prevent crises that are not coordinated efficiently will reduce 
the competitiveness for some countries. (EuropeanCommission, 2009). That leads us again to 
the OCA theory, suggesting a more integrated area to be more effective as a currency union 
than one who is not. Martin Blessing, Chairman of the Board of Managing Directors of 
Commerzbank presented this phrase in a comment on one of Barry Eichengreen’s articles: 
―Without political integration Europe will become more and more unimportant globally.‖ 
(Eichengreen, 2010, p. 23) 
Once again the future challenges of the Eurozone come down to the ability to 
cooperate efficiently and the level of integration between the different countries. The 
Eurozone has achieved a lot, creating an international and credible currency as well as price 
stability. The Eurozone are discussing mechanisms for crisis handling and there has been 
some increased intra-European trade after the introduction of the euro. Is it likely that Europe 
in the future will become an Optimum Currency Area according to the theory? 
The criteria of the OCA theory are not something that is given and cannot change. It is 
a dynamic process where there always will be room for improvements. There has been an 
increase in the trade levels between Europe as stated before, but not as significant amount that 
would have justified the single currency by itself according to the critics. Perhaps the most 
striking difference between the US and Europe is the labor mobility criterion. Unemployment 
is on a general note higher and longer lasting in Europe because of the lack of mobility of the 
labor force. Differences in regulations when it comes to unemployment benefits and worker 
protection also play its part. The criterion that is most likely to change in a positive way in the 
near future is the one concerning automatic fiscal transfers. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2009) 
The recent events have shown that the future of the Eurozone is dependent on the 
ability to handle crises. The consequences of the economic shock have been a heavy burden 
for the EU and a sustainable mechanism to prevent crises is needed. This is now not only 
something American economists believe, even the European Commission has acknowledged 
that the framework present up until the crisis was insufficient as they presented in their paper. 
Some changes are bound to happen; the question is to what extent. Some experts believe in 
more radical changes than others. 
Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer at the Centre for European Policy Studies suggest that 
a European Monetary Fund (EMF) needs to be set up. This should be set up as such that 
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national governments pay contributions to the EMF according to the risk levels of their 
finances. For example a country running heavy deficits and that has a high level of debt will 
have to pay more as a percentage of their GDP in contributions to the EMF, and thus creating 
economic incentives for fiscal discipline while having a permanent mechanism for fiscal 
transfers. (Gros & Mayer, 2010) 
From an economic viewpoint it is easy to see the advantages of this. The ability to 
neutralize economic shocks is there and the moral hazard problem is minimized through the 
punishment system on fiscal discipline. Implementing this can be tough however. One of the 
main challenges for the EU will probably be to create support for such a mechanism. It is well 
known that the countries that are weaker financially are more positive towards such a system 
than the stronger economies. In particular Germany has been very negative towards this. The 
fear that the Eurozone will become a place where the richer countries “pay” for the weaker is 
believed to be the cause of concern. Because of this the financial crisis might actually be a 
blessing in disguise for the Eurozone. The serious shock of this crisis has brutally 
demonstrated the need for a crisis mechanism, and probably one that involves quick fiscal 
transfers. Not long ago, before the recession, a mechanism for fiscal transfers was seemingly 
unneeded and looked unthinkable. Urgent times need urgent measures, and now the issue is 
discussed although with disagreements between the member countries. 
A concrete challenge for the Eurozone is of course to reduce its debt levels, especially 
for the countries that seem to be in the greatest difficulties. Wage levels will need to go down, 
productivity has to increase and taxes probably have to increase. A high percentage of the 
GDP will need to be spent on managing loans. This is doable if the authorities can create a 
feeling of togetherness in the time of crisis, making everyone drag in the same direction 
towards decreasing the costs. A worrying factor in this sense is the increasing percentage of 
older people soon to come in Europe.  
―For the EU27 the old age dependency ratio in 2030 is expected to rise to 38.0% from 
25.4% in 2008. This means that where, in 2008, 100 persons of working age supported 25 
persons aged 65 or over, in 2030 they are projected to support 38%... It is noted that in more 
than half of the 281 regions the old age dependency ratio is projected to increase by more 
than 13 percentage points over the period 2008-2030.‖ (Giannakouris, 2010, p. 6) 
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An ageing population will be more costly because of the loss of tax revenue from 
retirees and the increase in pension benefits. Against Greece which is the country most 
heavily discussed at the moment, one of the main points of criticism have been the low age of 
retirement. The longer they can keep workers employed the better for the economy, and this is 
one of the measures that are discussed.  
Restructuring of the economies has begun in order to decrease the costs. A mechanism 
for crisis prevention has broad consensus. There is no doubt that the EU acknowledges the 
severity of the situation. Still, it is far from certain that a crisis mechanism will prevent 
economic crises. They can still happen and as such it might be reasonable to have a system of 
fiscal transfers as a safety net, especially given the low labor mobility in Europe. A currency 
union does after all have unique challenges when faced with asymmetric shocks.  
Another point of uncertainty concerning the future is the fact that the Eurozone 
partnership is something unique in history. Nothing similar to this scale of currency 
partnerships has been present where almost an entire continent decides to share its currency. 
One can argue that the US economy is similar in size but unique challenges for Europe 
involve different countries and cultures. Therefore looking at history for similar events will 
only provide limited applicability for the Eurozone. 
Although structural changes have started and more are planned, the seriousness of the 
situation in Greece cannot be underestimated. Some experts believe that there still is a 
probability of default or even dismissal of the currency for Greece. The following section will 
cover possible scenarios for the European countries facing difficulties, with special emphasis 
on Greece. 
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5.3 Possible Outcomes of the Situation 
 
In the case of Greece, Michael G. Arghyrou and John D. Tsoukalas present two 
possible scenarios in the article ―The Greek Debt Crises: Likely Causes, Mechanics and 
Outcomes‖ (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011); one optimistic and one pessimistic.  
The major issue for Greece is to regain confidence in the market. Greece has suffered 
higher interest rates on its loans than other more credible European countries since 2009. 
Given this, the rescue package of 2010 from the EU and the IMF was probably the only 
option available to receive the credit needed to get Greece back on its feet. To receive the 
package the EU and the IMF needed transparency in the country’s policies, which was an 
unpopular decision made by the government. Thus it does signal a strong will towards 
strengthening the fiscal discipline of the country, something the bonds will be positively 
influenced by. This is still not enough. Reforms are needed to convince the market. (Arghyrou 
& Tsoukalas, 2011) 
The optimistic scenario is that Greece will show the determination needed to turn the 
situation around. This will include cuts in social benefits which may result in social unrest and 
demonstrations. If Greece still manages to get the people’s support for these changes, the 
market will likely have a more optimistic outlook on Greek bonds. With time it is also needed 
to remove the temporary support from the EU and the IMF to fully restore the confidence that 
Greece lost. It will not be easy; the results will likely be lower output and increased 
unemployment in the short run. There are also external risk from possible new shocks in the 
Eurozone economies and the possibility of losing the funding from the IMF and the EU. 
(Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011) 
The pessimistic scenario is the opposite. If the needed reforms experience resistance 
and reluctance in Greece, the market will react accordingly. This means that Greek 
government bonds will experience greater spreads in comparison with for example Germany. 
Another consequence will be a stop in the funding from the IMF and the EU. If this is the 
reaction from the Greek government, the only possibility to recover is for Greece to leave the 
EMU. If this happens the risk associated with the possibility of Greece leaving the EMU will 
disappear, but the market will likely react apprehensively to a new independent monetary 
policy for Greece. To reintroduce the drachma will devalue the assets held by Greek banks as 
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well, a scenario meaning a broadening of the crisis in the economy. (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 
2011) 
In sum the article states that the outcome is all up to Greece. If Greece implements the 
reforms needed successfully they can stay in the EMU. This depends on the authority’s 
willingness for such reforms as well as their ability to communicate effectively to their 
citizens. They must convey that these reforms will result in staying within the Eurozone, and 
that this is beneficial for everyone. (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011) 
The article does touch upon the possibility of contagion to the other countries in 
EMU’s periphery as well. They conclude that Greece is in a unique situation, but they cannot 
neglect the possibility that other countries may experience similar difficulties. Portugal, Spain 
and Ireland seem to be the other countries at risk according to the spread levels. Italy with its 
high debt is also at risk. In order for them to not become the “new Greece” they need to show 
signs that they are also willing to implement structural reforms. Similar problems as in Greece 
will be experienced in these countries to then, and a clear strategy and communication 
towards their citizens will be the key. (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2011) 
Another economist that presents what he believes is the most likely outcomes of the 
current crisis is Paul Krugman.  Four alternatives are covered and he calls them “four 
European plotlines” in his article ―Can Europe Be Saved?‖(Krugman, 2011) 
He finds many similarities in today’s situation in Greece and other European periphery 
economies to that of Argentina in 1991. Argentina at that time had a link between the dollar 
and the peso where every peso in circulation was backed by a dollar in reserves. This was 
mainly done in order to prevent Argentina from returning to old sins – printing money to 
finance its deficits. This link was successful for a large portion of the 1990s where low 
interest rates and foreign investments were the melody. Later, however, much of the same 
happened in Argentina as in Greece. A recession struck the economy and the market reacted 
with loss of confidence towards Argentina. Argentina responded with restructuring of the 
economy as well receiving loans from the IMF. The efforts did not work out; the results were 
demonstrations, high unemployment and deflation. The link between the dollar and the peso 
was removed and Argentina had to default on their debt. Krugman says that the outcome in 
Europe might not be the same even though the examples are similar. Four outcomes are likely 
according to him. (Krugman, 2011) 
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He calls the first scenario “Toughing it out”: This is a similar outcome as the first 
optimistic scenario presented by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas where troubled European 
economies, through proving determination and will, can be able to turn the situation around. 
A high degree of fiscal discipline is needed for the wages to gradually decrease and to 
reintroduce competitiveness. This will eventually restore the market belief in these European 
economies, but the social costs will be great in terms of unemployment and output loss. 
(Krugman, 2011) 
The second scenario presented by Krugman is debt restructuring. Krugman believes 
that the current interest rates on Greek and Irish bonds reflect that the market does not have 
faith in these countries. The market believes that a restructuring of their debt is on the agenda, 
meaning that they will not pay back 100% of their loans. This scenario does not automatically 
bring the crisis economies of Europe back on their feet. On the positive side it can help restore 
the confidence in the market and better the interest rates, but deflation and wage suppression 
with their unfavorable social consequences will still be needed. Krugman believes Greece will 
have a tough time getting out of the crisis without restructuring of their debt and that Ireland 
does not have a much better outlook. (Krugman, 2011) 
“Full Argentina” is the name of Paul Krugman’s third possible scenario. As presented 
earlier Argentina rejected the link between the peso and the dollar and in effect devalued the 
peso. For countries in the Eurozone to do a similar action they would need to reject the euro 
and bring back the national currency.  A suggestion that this might happen can lead to a bank 
run in the particular country. (Krugman, 2011) 
The fourth and last scenario is more optimistic than the others and is called “Revived 
Europeanism”. This scenario implies that improved integration will rescue the Eurozone. 
Krugman explains why he thinks this scenario is unlikely by an example: The Prime Minister 
of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker and the Finance Minister of Italy suggested a creation of 
“E-Bonds” to countries of Europe with safety from the whole European Union. This proposal 
was met with massive opposition from Germany. Krugman believes that a fiscal transfer 
system that can be compared to the one in USA is far off in Europe when this proposal, which 
is a small step in the right direction, met such criticism from the most powerful nation in the 
Eurozone. (Krugman, 2011) 
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The current strategy that the EU executes is the optimistic or the “tough it out” 
strategy. They have faith in the countries’ willingness and ability to cut costs and increase 
taxes. The EU has provided loans in cooperation with the IMF. Unfortunately, the market 
does not agree. The media at the moment is flooded with headlines that convey record 
breaking interest rates and economists who can see no other way out than debt default. The 
consequences of a default will be a loss in credibility of the whole Eurozone, and a failure of 
one of their main principles. It will also be a legitimization of moral hazard, where countries 
running deficits and unsustainable economic policy will be rescued. People or institutions that 
are not responsible for the situation will have to pay for the losses. It is by no means an ideal 
situation, but if the countries involved do not show signs of sustainable changes it becomes 
inevitable.  
It seems as though the countries in trouble at the moment will have to endure painful 
economic reforms, unemployment, high taxes and sluggish growth for the foreseeable future 
in order to regain competitiveness no matter which of the presented alternatives that actually 
plays out. It is without doubt that from an economic viewpoint, the best alternative is to create 
an efficient fiscal transfer union, possibly by the model of Daniel Gros and Thomas Mayer. 
Unfortunately, politics is a major obstacle for such a solution.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
In this study I started with presenting the history of economic integration in Europe. I 
found that the idea of an integrated Europe is not a new one that came about at the creation of 
the EU. Furthermore, I found that the creation of a common currency was perceived to be a 
radical increase in economic integration in Europe, and this became a reality in 1999. At the 
time before and up until the creation of the euro it could seem that a sweep of optimism 
caught Europe and that political arguments, not only economic arguments, played a part in the 
decision of a monetary union.  
In the second part of the study I presented economic theory and in particular the 
Optimum Currency Area theory. The conclusion here was that the US is by far a more 
beneficial area for a fixed currency compared with Europe.  
The third part covers the euro at the present time with emphasis on the current 
recession, as well as the inflamed debate over the euro possibly worsening the problems for 
Europe. Lessons from this part are that Europe is experiencing a severe economic crisis and 
that the critics of the euro argue that Europe is not integrated enough to justify a single 
currency, while the other side of the debate point out lack of alternatives and achievements 
made by the monetary union as arguments.  
The fourth part of the study speculates around the future. Possible solutions for Europe 
as well as possible outcomes for the countries in trouble were presented. The future is 
uncertain, although a crisis mechanism and institutional changes in one way or another are 
bound to happen. 
What can we conclude from all this? It is obvious that the euro both has its advantages 
and its disadvantages. What this crisis brutally has discovered however, is the need for a 
sustainable crisis mechanism. Right now the Eurozone has little power to neutralize economic 
shocks other than reactive loans that needs time to negotiate. The vulnerability is striking; 
when a country is struggling with high debt levels and interest rates on government bonds that 
often is the case during crises, the only way the Eurozone can help is through a bailout 
package. The countries themselves cannot use monetary policy in order to restore the 
situation. The creation of a fiscal transfer union seems to be the obvious long-term solution 
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given that the Eurozone, at least in comparison with USA, is rather immobile when it comes 
to labor mobility.  
For a mechanism of fiscal transfers to be effective and not become an arena for 
exploitation, it needs a system that rewards fiscal discipline. It should not by any means be a 
mechanism where the stronger European economies are paying the weaker ones. This seems 
to be the general fear of the stronger European economies and it makes the political process of 
creating such a mechanism a difficult one.  
To answer the question in the title of the thesis the euro as it works at the moment 
have clear weaknesses to such an extent that it may not be sustainable. The market at the 
moment has little faith in recovery and believes that default is a scenario that is nearly 
inevitable, something reflected in the increasing spreads in countries like Greece. The debt 
levels are reaching critical amounts that it is hard to see the countries managing by 
themselves. A crisis resolution mechanism is urgent. 
In order for the outcome to be a long-term positive one major institutional changes are 
needed. The countries in trouble will need to undergo social cuts and tax increases to reduce 
the deficits. In the short-run the outlook in certain countries looks bleak. However, if the 
Eurozone can cooperate and actually become more politically integrated the future looks 
brighter. A need for extensive cooperation between all the countries in the Eurozone is a 
prerequisite for the future existence of the currency union. Europe is not an optimum currency 
area at the moment, but as stated earlier, the criteria are not frozen. For the Eurozone to 
become more of an effective currency union every country needs to understand the problems 
and act with solidarity. That will benefit the whole Eurozone in the long-run. It is starting to 
become urgent – Europe is a major player in the world economy. A failure of the currency 
union can have unknown and disastrous economic consequences for the world. 
One might say that the euro was an experiment that Europe was not yet ready for and 
that the decision was based on other successful reforms and “European romance”. Whether 
this is right or not, now when the euro is introduced it is hard to reverse back to national 
currencies. The key issue right now is to have a long-term view and get the struggling 
economies back on their feet as quickly as possible. Secondly, a sustainable crisis mechanism 
needs to be enforced. The Eurozone cannot passively watch another blow such as the shock in 
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the economy experienced in the late 2000s and be unable to do anything about it. To not 
introduce a more proper defense mechanism is arguably unacceptable and unlikely. 
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